When multiple crises confront global leaders, some yet-brewing ones tend to be ignored. One such is an(other) imminent external debt crisis in developing countries, which, as in the case of the COVID-19 crisis, is likely to be prolonged with long-term spillovers. However, while most observers admit that another external debt crisis is imminent, a commitment to find a lasting solution is absent. Not because the elements of such a solution are not obvious. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine invasion having made this round of the debt crisis even more difficult to resolve, there is little option but to resort to a package that includes official debt write-offs, large private creditor haircuts and the channelling of cheap liquidity to less developed countries through mechanisms like enhanced Special Drawing Rights issues.
The COVID-19 pandemic has been an unprecedented exogenous shock in the world economy unlike the global financial crisis in 2008, which was endogenously determined in the structure of capitalist financial market. Given the fact that Indian export sector significantly contributes to the Indian economy in general and employment in particular, it is worth examining how the Indian gross domestic product and exports changed in comparison with the world GDP and world exports respectively, in the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–21 vis-à-vis the GFC in 2008. Which industries are affected the most, in terms of export loss, during this COVID-19 crisis? What have been the consequences of these falling export on employment and earnings in the Indian export sector? This study estimates that in the COVID-19 year 2020–21, Indian exports have fallen by `3.74 lakh crore, with a plausible loss of direct employment by 5.06 lakh and an estimated loss of earnings around `12.4 thousand crore across 85 commodities.
Unlike common assumptions, private banks do not inherently perform better than public sector banks. The reasons that are often cited for privatisation of public sector banks require deeper scrutiny.
The prolonged deployment of “unconventional” monetary policy responses that began in reaction to the financial crisis of 2008, especially “quantitative easing,” set off speculative investments and fuelled asset bubbles. Since they cannot allow the new bubbles to give in, policymakers must persist with decisions that inflate asset prices. By doing so, they end up sitting one more bubble on the previous one. The probability that one or both may burst has only increased.
A study of the financial processes underlying India’s high-growth trajectory of the 2000s and its relationship with “riskless capitalism,” a term first used by Raghuram Rajan in November 2014, finds that the Indian growth story cannot be over-simplistically explained as a result of “market-oriented” reforms. Public sector bank credit-financed investments, particularly in the infrastructure sector, played a significant role in sustaining growth, most crucially after the global economic crisis. Such a growth trajectory, however, proved to be unsustainable with the expansionary phase coming to an end in 2011–12 and bad loans piling up in the banking system.
The slowdown in the economy and the resultant rise in bad loans have led to criticism of public sector banks and questioning of their raison d’être. While there is a rush to find a quick solution by merging PSBs, it would be wise to examine the ground realities closely. India needs a mix of efficiently run PSBs and aggressive private banks to achieve growth and development along with social justice.
The Lehman moment is the moment when Lehman Brothers—one of the largest investment banks in the United States (US) at the time—collapsed. The collapse happened on 15 September 2008.
Looking Back at Macroeconomics 101: A Ringside View of the Global Financial Crisis from Asia in Real Time by Alok Sheel; Academic Foundation, 2015; pp 422, ₹1,295.
It is generally believed that India is doing far better than most emerging market economies in these times of global economic turmoil. Emerging markets are facing capital flight, with large-scale outflows, especially since the second half of 2015, with the trend expected to continue in 2016. India has been less affected than others, but is clearly vulnerable due to the large number of Indian firms that are exposed to external borrowings, a weak rupee, a year or more of declining merchandise exports, falling corporate profitability, and stressed corporate balance sheets.
Indian banking is passing through its most severe period of stress in over a decade. It is important, however, not to draw conclusions for banking policy from a snapshot of the most recent period--the totality of the post-reform experience must be taken into account. That larger experience shows that India's public sector-dominated banking system has served the economy well by improving its performance in respect of both efficiency and stability. Looking ahead, changes in governance and management are required, but it is possible to effect these within the framework of public ownership.
