

of co-operation. One thing at least unites all the 32 countries, and that is determined opposition to South Africa and Portugal and their practice of *apartheid*. Most of them also follow non-alignment to a greater or lesser degree. The non-alignment was inspired by India. If India could, why not Africa? It is a tribute to India that so many African States have openly acknowledged their debt to the Indian example. Now it is India's turn; if so many 'un-committed' African countries can practise non-alignment with success, cannot also India? Or have our circumstances changed so fundamentally?

To many people, including Indians (if they think about Africa), the general swing to one-party states in Africa is alarming. The author is sympathetic to it, but his arguments remain unconvincing. He says that in each country there was a single political party demanding independence; since no opposition party existed, there was, therefore, no need for one after independence. Julius Nyerere has summed up the justification for one-party rule thus, 'There is no remaining division between 'rulers' and 'ruled', no monopoly of political power by any sectional group, which could give rise to conflicting parties. A multi-party system would, at best, lead to the trivial manoeuvring; of 'opposing* groups whose time is spent in the inflation of artificial differences into some semblance of reality, 'for the sake of preserving democracy''. It may be that the only opposition now is merely a reactionary, secessionist minority in Africa and that *at present* all governments command the full support of all their people, but the denial of the right to form opposition parties can lead eventually only to some kind of totalitarianism. To say "... while Ghana has political prisoners today, she has yet to have her first political execution" hardly provides reasonable support for the author's view that the one-party State in Africa is a democratic institution.

This book is not for those who seek to know anything of the impact of communist powers on Africa. There is scant reference to communism as such and no mention of the involvement of communist powers in the affairs of any African country. It is a fact that no African country had a strong communist party before independence; but it does not follow that there is no communist interest now in the continent. By barely mentioning the

communist powers, the author implies that only America and the ex-colonial powers are in any way interested in what happens in the continent which is certainly not the case.

What is there for Indians to learn from this book? In both India and Africa, there was a failure to realise that political independence was far from being an end in itself, resulting in the lack of a widely shared sense of mission regarding social and economic problems. Some kind of a political elite had emerged under colonial rule, but under the heady influence of freedom, far too many members of this elite — in Africa as in India — sought to take the white man's place and enjoy his privileges. One author wrote in 1963 of "the appalling mismanagement of our public affairs, the lack of sense of direction on the national level, the moral depravity of our society...". This could have been an Indian writ-

ing about India; in fact it is a Nigerian (Gabriel Faqpure) writing about Nigeria. Equally relevant is the eloquent comment of another Nigerian (Tai Solarin) about his country: "One thing is clear in the minds of the young elements in our country — Nigeria is not being effectively governed. Our government is a hydra-headed octopus that veers and backs, depending on the prevailing planetary and political winds, and that oscillates and flounders and hopes, whatever happens, for the best. It is not purposive; it is not logical; it is not disciplined."

Davidson wisely remains content with predicting very little for the future, the title of his book notwithstanding. He is certain that Africa will play an increasingly important role in world affairs — a conclusion that is unexceptionable. This is a well-written little book. Unfortunately its usefulness is somewhat reduced by the absence of a reading list.

The Psychiatry of War

Prabhakar Ghate

Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War Report No 57
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry; New York; 94 pp.

IT is possible to classify, as Kenneth Waltz in his "Man, the State and War" did, the seminal thinkers on the problem of war into three main groups. There were those, like Thomas Hobbes, who regarded war as arising inevitably out of the nature of man. Others attributed war to the intrinsic nature of particular types of state, such as Karl Marx's capitalist-industrial state which had to expand overseas in search of markets, raw materials and investment opportunities, or, to take a more recent example, C Wright Mills' state dominated by the militaristic 'power elite'. A third group regarded war as an inexorable consequence of the nature of 'international society', a society which lacked a common authority with a monopoly of force superior to its constituent units. These diagnoses of the causes of war led to three corresponding sets of solutions. Until fairly recently a book by a psychiatrist would more likely than not have seen the solution to the problem of war as lying exclusively in the rectification of human nature.

The "Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War", one of a series of booklets published by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry and prepared by its Commit-

tee on Social Issues, does not fall into this error. It recognizes that the problem of war is multi-faceted. It regards conflict between groups as inevitable, while recognizing that conflict is not synonymous with war. If conflict is to be prevented from taking the shape of war, what is needed instead is a continuing process of non-violent resolution of conflict. This, the report points out, rejecting the uni-dimensional fallacy, will entail profound developments in diplomacy, law, politics, technology, and ideology, *as well as* the modification "of many entrenched complexities of human nature and behaviour ;it both individual and societal levels'.

Having recognized the limitations imposed on psychiatry's contribution by the very nature of the subject and "the need to stay within the limits of psychiatry when seeking to apply its insights and methodologies to broad problem areas", the report goes on to staunchly defend the value of that contribution on these grounds: "the complex nature of these issues requires a pooling of knowledge, collaborative effort, and better communication at various levels between psychiatrists and other behavioural scientists, between behavioural and natural scientists...

One of the many advantages of such joint endeavours is that they tend to counteract one-sidedness, blind spots, and bias in any participating group or individual". To this end the report seeks to make available to colleagues in various disciplines the results obtained by subjecting a mass of material derived from other sources (the Committee has not conducted its own research, except bibliographical) to the processes of psychiatric 'filtration', assimilation, integration and deliberation." It hopes thereby to stimulate further research into the emotional, irrational, and individual human factors involved in specific issues of peace-keeping.

In discussing the relationship of war and human nature the report takes the view that war is not rooted in human nature. It has never been simply a collective expression of individual hostility and aggressiveness, merely the sum total of countless individual aggressions. On the contrary, war is a social institution, and like all social institutions it must potentially be capable of change and eradication. Cannibalism, slavery and ritual human-sacrifice must have all seemed deeply rooted in human nature when they were prevalent.

The report admits that war has traditionally provided an outlet for the release of destructive (and cohesive) impulses. In this sense it has found sustenance in them. But progressive changes in the character of warfare have rendered it an increasingly unsatisfactory outlet. The distance between the individual soldier and his enemy has increased, making war more and more impersonal and mechanical. The best soldier is no longer a hero, but an automaton.

In discussing some of the psychological responses of individuals and groups that contribute to the continuance of the arms race and render a non-violent solution of the current East-West struggle (or any struggle for that matter) difficult, the report deals in particular detail with the phenomenon of dehumanization'. This, it points out, is a serious and fundamental problem of our time, to which the forces of industrialization, specialisation, bureaucratization, and automation are increasingly contributing. Dehumanization is the tendency to denude other individuals and groups of human qualities in order to protect a person from feelings of guilt and

shame about the way he feels about or acts towards them. It is a defence mechanism which enables one to write off other people's suffering or death as something that neither concerns nor moves one personally, and with which no identification takes place. While dehumanization makes statistics out of other people, it has a similar effect on the self. It leads to an image of oneself as powerless, a mere cog in the wheel, passively following orders. It stifles one's capacity to feel and act like a human being. It results in a diminished sense of personal responsibility for the consequences of one's actions, and prevents people from taking steps essential to the maintenance of the well-being of society and the prevention of mass destruction. The report underlines the need "to investigate what innovations in modes of thinking are needed, and how they may be brought about, to counteract the intensified callousness toward human worth and suffering resulting from the advances in modern technology and the push-button aspects of nuclear warfare."

The Dangers of Deterrence

The report discusses the policy of deterrence in some detail, because as it rightly points out, it is the relationship of mutual deterrence between the two super-powers that is responsible for having prevented 'he outbreak of nuclear war so far. But, it adds, though the nuclear stalemate, or the balance of terror, has proved a useful temporary expedient, long-term reliance on it as a permanent arrangement is fraught with dangers. Deterrence can fail, partly because some of the psychological assumptions on which it rests are dubious. Firstly, it assumes that there will be rational and responsible control on both sides of the decision to use nuclear weapons. But behaviour under stress of extreme fear tends to become more impulsive and less rational. The spread of nuclear weapons to other powers will increase the chances of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of those with limited tolerance for emotional strain. Secondly, there are people with suicidal tendencies, who in destroying themselves have no compunction about destroying others. Thirdly, deterrence suffers from the drawback that it deters the other side by the threat of punishment. It does not use the promise of reward. Punishment, or the threat of it, may inhibit acts undesired by the 'deterrent', but it leaves the underlying motivation

unchanged and, if anything, acerbates hostility towards the 'deterrent'. Reward on the other hand creates a favourable attitude towards the rewarder, thereby reducing the incentive towards undesired behaviour.

Confronted as we are with these (and other non-psychological) deficiencies in the present system of mutual deterrence, the search for more satisfactory arrangements for the maintenance of international security must continue. But under any system there will remain the need for some means by which conflict can be conducted and resolved without resort to violence. (It is interesting to note that under a system of world government, or a centralised authority with a preponderance of coercive power, though that need will still be great, it will no longer be vital, since conflict, if it does lead to violence, will be containable within safe limits by the preponderant force of the central authority, and will be resolved according to the will and law of the world community.)

The report examines some non-violent methods of conducting conflict, involving action by one, both and third parties. As an example of action involving one party to a conflict the report contains an interesting discussion of non-cooperative non-violent action on Gandhian lines. It is enthusiastic about the advantages and prospects of this means of conflict in the domestic sphere, but points out that its applicability to international conflict seems limited, because its effectiveness depends on making an ally of the opponent's conscience, on appealing to a set of shared values and exemplifying the opponent's ideals. This can only happen when there is continuous personal contact between members of opposing groups — a condition which is not met in conflicts between nations. Examples of action taken by both parties to a conflict are negotiations, and competitive co-existence, in which the opposing parties mutually undertake to desist from active efforts at destroying each other. Action taken by third parties may be informal, or may involve formal procedures such as arbitration or negotiation. Moreover, supranational organisations also play 'third party' roles. The discussion of the psychological aspects of all these alternatives to violence in the conduct of conflict makes fascinating reading. What is more, the report shows that they hold out hope of reducing tension between national adversaries.