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## India's Risk in Congo

THE Security Council resolution sanctioning the use of force in the Congo "in the last resort" is now more than a month old, but the situation in that unfortunate country remains as chaotic as ever, and no signs of any improvement are visible on the horizon. Active Belgian participation in Congolese affairs at all levels has not ceased; Shri Dayal has again reported that other "foreign embassies" are directly interfering in the situation; the local leaders of the various factions and provinces have been pulling the country further apart; arms pacts have been signed between pairs of them; law and order is still in a state of near-collapse; the people face a famine which is now said to be spreading to the U N personnel as well; and — most important of all — the United Nations itself has suffered a serious set-back as a result of its defeat at the port of Matadi. So what use, after all, was the much-boasted "Use of Force" resolution?

The moral is simple. A mere mandate is not enough; those who have to carry it out must be enabled to do so. It is all very well to decide, belatedly, that the use of force by the U N would be justified in certain circumstances in the Congo, but unless that force is made available, how is it to be used? The defeat of the Sudanese contingent at Matadi shows that the U N is not even strong enough to hold its own at the moment, let alone to undertake the major operation of disarming the *Force Publique* and all its subsidiary bands. India is so far the only country which has shown some realism in the matter, by sending a large, combat unit to strengthen the hands of Mr Hammarskjöld and Shri Dayal. Since then, however, the Sudanese — chagrined by the Matadi incident — have been recalled by their Government, and no further troops have arrived. This is clearly a dangerous situation, only only will it neutralise the gain resulting from the Indian contribution, but unless the other Afro-Asian States quickly follow our example, we ourselves might get involved in a hopeless wrangle from which extrication will not be easy.

India, therefore, has particular reason to be concerned at the stagnation which seems to have overtaken the United Nations operation in the Congo since the, resolution of February 21. The decision to send the troops was a bold one, which means among other things, that it involved considerable risks to ourselves, politically speaking. No doubt, New Delhi must have taken the elementary precaution of consulting the leading African States on its proposed action; but in spite of that, if India remains for any further length of time, the only country to augment the U N force at this stage, there is no doubt whatever that its presence in Ueopoldville will be vilified by the political propagandists who have their own reasons for seeing that the U N operation fails. Consequently, it is important to us in our own interests as well as in the interests of the V N mandate that the Government of India should go all out to whip up interest in the February resolution and quickly persuade other sympathetic countries, preferably in Africa, to give Mr Hammarskjöld the troops he needs to discipline the armed bauds which are making all political solution impossible.

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