

establishment of Israel as a sovereign State. Subsequent events are too recent, and well-known. Britain, France and America were agreed that Cairo's policy was a threat to peace in west Asia. Israel exploited this common Western policy to start an aggressive war against Egypt. In their turn, Britain and France pleaded the excuse of Israeli aggression to commit acts of aggression against Egypt. Under the Tripartite Agreement, Britain and France could have justified their armed intervention to ensure cease-fire in the fighting between Israel and Egypt. That they had ulterior motives, was revealed in their joint aggression against Egypt. But the outside world will not miss the implication of the fact that America did nothing then to discharge her obligations under the Tripartite Agreements.

Only when the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt proved a disastrous failure—America admittedly, followed a wise and courageous policy in checking the joint aggression—did America enunciate the Eisenhower Doctrine. This Doctrine is based on two assumptions

both of which are wrong and invalid. One is that the ignominious Anglo-French, particularly British, retreat from west Asia has created a power-vacuum there. This is a distorted way of looking at west Asia. Even as Britain has quitted south-east Asia, her withdrawal from west Asia is an inevitable process in the abolition of colonialism; no less inevitable is the gradual retreat by France from Africa. But neither the British withdrawal from Asia nor the French retreat from Africa can, or should, create any power-vacuum in these regions. Resurgent nationalism is the obverse side of this process of retreat by the colonial Powers. Along with the withdrawal by colonial Powers, free stable and democratic nations are emerging gradually. No question of power-vacuum arises here. To introduce power politics, is to project the "cold war".

Another assumption behind the Eisenhower Doctrine is that the Communist influence is growing in west Asia. Here, as elsewhere, the Soviet Union exploits the prevailing disturbances, she does not create these troubles. Even on the assumption of growing, spheres of Soviet

influence In west Asia, the Eisenhower Doctrine ignores the earlier offer of M. Bulganin for a general arms embargo on west Asia. In April last, M. Bulganin made such a proposal to the Western Powers. It was not even considered by them. M. Shepilov has now repeated this proposal. But it is evident that M Shepilov's proposal will not have a better response than that of M Bulganin. M Shepilov has enunciated six principles on which the relations between the four Powers and "the Middle and Near East" should be based. These principles are in conformity with the Charter, and embody the essential features of ranch Shila. If the Western Powers do not accept these principles as a basis for discussion for formulating the policy of the four Powers to west Asia, Moscow will be justified In its suspicions that the Western Powers are not willing to implement the principle of competitive co-existence in Asia. In the event, suspicions will deepen that America is more interested in the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area than in ensuring regional or global peace.

## Threat from the East

WILL- Maulana Bhasani be able to maintain his pace and force Karachi to toe the foreign policy line laid down by the Awami League, of which he is the President, at the cultural conference held with so much eclat at Kagmari in Tangail sub-division of Mymensingh district, East Bengal? Mr. Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, has been following a foreign policy diametrically opposed to the one professed by the Awami League from which he draws his strength and to which he owes his position in the Government. How do the followers of Bhasani and the members of the Awami League put up with this flagrant violation of the party's creed? There is no simple answer to it. For however quizzical the situation may look to an outsider it must not be forgotten that Mr Suhrawardy is the head of a coalition Government in which his own party is in a minority; and not all members of the Awami League swear by Bhasani's foreign politics, though on many other issues, they enthusiastically support their leader.

By the rank and file of the East Bengal Muslims, the Awami League

is held as a deliverer from the domination of the Punjabi, the U P and the Bihari refugee, and from the exploitation of the East by West Pakistan in general. The Awami League has spear pointed this attack against the West and has won many initial victories. Pakistan's First Five Year Plan, it will be recalled, had to be abandoned because of the persistent opposition to it put up by among others, the special conference of economists of East Pakistan, which had been called to approve the Draft-Plan. The East Pakistan Cabinet run by the Awami League has been outright in its unreserved condemnation of the economic policies pursued by Karachi in the last 10 years which, it says, has enriched the West and impoverished the East.

But it must not be supposed that the members of the Awami League, whether in the Government or outside, are equally keen about the foreign policy professed by their party, except that none of them are prepared to make the same issue of Kashmir as the people and parties in West Pakistan. This underlies Mr Suhrawardy's counsel to tone down the Kashmir and anti-Nehru

agitation in Pakistan. On the question of Kashmir, the East Bengal Muslim has mental reservations which arise as much from distance and ignorance as from the fact that the agitation is led largely by non-Bengali Muslims. It is Mullahs from Lahore who are prominent in meetings and demonstrations held in East Pakistan to ventilate grievances against Kashmir, and for this very reason, such meetings and demonstrations in East Pakistan fail to draw any crowds at all. But on other questions of foreign policy, the Bengali-Muslim who is otherwise an ardent supporter of Bhasani and the Awami League, is hardly ever excited. On the contrary, India is big and because of her large resources she is a threat to Pakistan and the threat grows in dimensions as reports flow In of the progress India has been making, particularly in the sphere of economic development. It appears logical to him that Pakistan, poor, weak and backward, must turn to a powerful ally for her safety and sheer survival. And if Mr Suhrawardy attends the Baghdad Pact Conference in Middle East or gets American arms aid, the

average East Bengal Muslim is frankly unable to see what is wrong about it.

The Awami League as a party also shows the same fissures. This is evident from the attempts that are being made, and not so unsuccessfully after all, to get together the office bearers of the party to stand behind Mr Suhrawardy and win the support of the party for a foreign policy which runs counter to that reiterated so solemnly by Maulana Bhasani at the Kagmari Conference.

The reaction of an average Muslim in East Bengal to the domination by Karachi may be likened to that of one who has jumped from the frying pan into the fire, and he resents what he considers to be exploitation by the West Pakistan all the more, because Independence and the birth of Pakistan had meant for him freedom, at long last, from Hindu domination. It does not follow that he would like to change the one for the other.

If in the matter of foreign policy the Pakistan Prime Minister's position is anomalous vis-a-vis his own party, in the matter of economic policy, it is no less so. Apparently the budget presented by the Central Government—the first since he became Premier—owed little to the

Awami League Election Manifesto. The budget proposals were disowned by every section of public opinion, within Pakistan Assembly as well as outside and were castigated so severely that the Finance Minister was forced to withdraw them en masse and forthwith. The deficit which was to have been met by the abortive tax measures, has been left uncovered. It is now to be met from reduction in administrative expenditure, whatever, that might mean. Governments have been known to resign because the Legislature would not pass their budget; they also submit to criticism at times by modifying some of their proposals, considered non-essential. But parliamentary governments usually make an issue of the budget; Suhrawardy's Coalition Government has not done it and it is not his party which pins him down or threatens to withdraw its support because his budget flouts the Party mandate.

Curiously enough, the organ of the Muslim League which is now in opposition has been the most outspoken in its criticism of budget proposals which it condemned as favouring the rich and the top industrialists in a shame faced manner. Another stalwart of the Muslim League went further and during the discussion on the budget in the National Assembly pleaded eloquently for a "quick

general election" and for a revolutionary socialistic plan of economic development. It is not accidental that no underdeveloped country seems to be able to keep in power or even to put up a rightist party and parties which do not keep to the left seem to disappear from the scene soon enough, unless they are propped up by foreign arms.

That does not mean that progress is inevitable or that economic pressures will necessarily lead to planned development informed by a social policy. The Pakistan Muslim League organ 'Dawn' has asked Iskander Mirza to take the lead and form a National Government so that the fissiparous tendencies of the Awami League may be effectively curbed and Bhasani shut off. It looks as if Bhasani could be shut off, judging from the organisational weakness of his party. But it does not look as if Bhasani could be bought off with a Governorship as Fazlul Huq was or that the progress of East Pakistan, which is on the march, and has won its first round by making Bengali a national language, can be stopped so easily. The contest has now reached the second round in which the issues are economic. The Bengali Muslim is fighting as much for food and clothing as for his self-respect.

## Weekly Notes

### Of Dollars and Roubles

*Our Delhi Correspondent Writes:*

FROM a position of relative insignificance as source of foreign aid for India, the Soviet Union may soon get on to a position comparable to that of the US. Indications indeed are that the success of the Second Five Year Plan may be ultimately spelled out in terms of dollars and roubles,

Foreign aid would not only meet the country's foreign exchange deficit, but also help cover the gap in the internal resources. True, even accounting for the usual inability of the administration to spend the voted grants, enough rupees may not be available to meet the rising cost and implement the increasing number of sanctioned projects. Shri T T Krishnamachari has said that he is working out plans to raise additional resources and has often hinted at the revision of the taxation structure. Implementation of the Taxation Inquiry Commission's

proposals combined with some of the acceptable points made by Mr Kaldor, however, will take time. The earlier proposal to strengthen the Taxation Research Cell in the Central Board of Revenue by appointing a Joint Secretary in charge of the units seems to have been dropped. What the Finance Minister has in mind is known only to himself.

But there are some straws in the wind. It is now confirmed that the Prime Minister did not discuss the possibilities of increased American aid for India with President Eisenhower in the US; talks between the two leaders merely covered India's Second Plan generally. Informed opinion is unanimous that a bid for increased flow of dollars has a chance of success only if it emanates at the level of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru. Ordinarily the U S Congress is not likely to consider any request from India until reports of the four separate missions that have toured the country since December

last are available. It will be recalled that fact-finding surveys have been made successively by teams nominated by the U S Senate, the International Co-operation Administration, and the President's high-powered Committee of Citizens and recently, by Mr John Hollister, Director of I C A. Their reports are expected by April next and will take another month or two to collate. The dilatory procedure of U S legislation makes it inevitable that no action can be expected till June next. Even then, a fractional increase in the present quantum of T C M aid is all that can be hoped for.

Against this, the possibilities of the Soviet aid are as follows (rupees in crores):

Bhilai Steel Plant (committed)	80
Supplies of Steel (committed)	70
Long-term loan (offered)	55
Heavy Machine Building Plant	
(Possible)	60
Coal Mining Plant (Possible)	10