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paign for an independent Kashmir is not known. But the responsible political leaders of Kashmir cannot be unaware what such a status would mean for a State as strategically situated as Kashmir is, in the context of world power politics. Alternatively, both the people and the political elements in Kashmir should appreciate that it would be impossible for the Republic of India to assure any military protection or guarantee for the continued existence of Kashmir as an independent State.

That the Sheikh-saheb was manoeuvring to maintain his losing hold on the people by his diabolic campaign for an independent Kashmir, is not in doubt. He was playing for high stakes. His political opponents accuse him of collusion with "interested foreign Powers". He has paid the penalty which all ambitious politicians must pay when they gamble and lose. But the Sheikh-saheb's political tight-rope dancing has had an incidental sequel which is as unfortunate as his regrettable political metamorphosis.

Sheikh Abdullah's Cabinet has been dismissed, and he has been arrested, by the Government of Kashmir established in law. New Delhi has no authority to act in these matters, as the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to New Delhi, pending the plebiscite, is limited to the three subjects of defence, external affairs and communications. Even as India has no authority to protest against internal happenings in "Azad Kashmir", pending plebiscite, Pakistan cannot have any objection to, or lodge protests with India against, those developments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are the internal affairs of that State.

Yet, strange as it may seem, the Pakistan Government has expressed concern over developments in the Kashmir State. And the people and the Press in Pakistan are trying to revive the campaign for *jihad* against India. It is a matter for regret that Pandit Nehru has not promptly responded to the Pakistani Prime Minister's urgent request for a meeting with him to discuss the events in Kashmir. It would have been wiser for Pandit Nehru to concede the Pakistani Prime Minister's request for a meeting in order to make it plain to Mr Mohammed Ali that New Delhi is no less anxious than Karachi about the turn of events in Kashmir.

Diplomacy demanded that Pandit Nehru should have accepted Mr Mohammed Ali's suggestion for a meeting between them so that the sting could be taken out of the mischievous campaign that is being revived in Pakistan against India. But Mr Mohammed Ali and his Government have New Delhi's assurance that the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah have in no way changed India's attitude to the Kashmir problem. India is committed as before to holding a

plebiscite in Kashmir. This is one of the problems which the two Prime Ministers are expected to discuss when Mr Mohammed Ali pays his return visit to New Delhi next month. Recent events in Kashmir, and the open allegations about the mischievous machinations of foreign Powers, underline the imperative need for calm and dispassionate discussions on the disputed issues, including Kashmir, between India and Pakistan without any outside interference or intervention.

No End of Cold War

TT has been an eventful year.

Four outstanding developments happened during the last twelve months. After an eclipse of twenty years, the Republican Party in America, led by Mr Eisenhower, a distinguished soldier-statesman, was returned to power. Stalin's death was the second notable world event. Sir Winston Churchill's call for a "parley at the summit" was a logical sequel to the developments since Stalin's death. By signing an armistice in Korea, the Communists demonstrated that the British Prime Minister was not wrong in his interpretation of recent events in Russia.

Although the year has been eventful, its achievements are negligible. As Mr Eisenhower entered the White House, he succeeded in wresting the diplomatic initiative from the Communists. He enunciated a policy of firmness punctuated with tact. He affirmed his Government's desire for world peace and international co-operation. He declared that Russia must prove her peaceful intentions by peaceful deeds. Russia has responded to this call. But the gestures by Russia have not satisfied America, even as Russia deplores that President Eisenhower's peaceful expressions are belied by America's aggressive foreign policy.

Stalin's death has not led to any disruption within Russia. Beria's dismissal has not yet indicated any shift in the foreign policy elaborated by M Malenkov after Stalin's death. But the Eisenhower Administration's political schizophrenia has been evident from the beginning. Since the return of the Republican Party to power, Washington has been speaking with two voices. While Mr Eisenhower has been insistently demanding peaceful deeds by Russia, his Secretary of State has been stressing his policy of

"liberation".

Washington's diabolic political dualism is responsible for the worldwide disappointment that the year ends with its performance lagging far behind its promise. Mr John Foster Dulles has auto-suggested himself into his firm conviction that Russian peace gestures reflect the Soviet Union's developing weakness. In concluding an armistice in Korea, the Communists have made more substantial concessions than the UN Command. This, Mr Dulles interprets, is not an indication of Russia's peaceful intentions, but a proof that the Communists are too exhausted to continue the war in Korea. There is more than one possible explanation for the sequence of developments in Eastern Berlin and in Eastern Europe. But Mr Dulles is dogmatic that these events underline the weakening hold of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe. So Mr Dulles continues to dream of the day when his "liberation" policy will be fulfilled.

To all those who have been doing exercises in such wishful thinking, M Malenkov has given a firm reply. "We, too, have the hydrogen bomb," is his warning to those who are never tired of repeating that Russia's unilateral peace offers since Stalin's death stem from a sense of weakness. His robust address before the Supreme Soviet has been deplored as a sign of Moscow's combative instincts. This is a prejudiced interpretation of M Malenkov's speech. His address was aimed at dispelling the illusion that Russia has been left behind in the competitive race for armaments. He was emphatic that Russia, like the Western Powers, was negotiating from a position of strength. He was equally emphatic that, unlike Mr Dulles's policy of "liberation",

the foreign policy of the, strong Soviet Union was aimed at "peaceful co-existence". He reaffirmed the Soviet Union's desire for a negotiated settlement of disputes. But he made it clear that the Western Powers must be prepared to come to an agreement with Russia as an equal.

These are the main currents and cross-currents which explain the ominous limitations of the two positive developments during the year. There are reasons why the Korean armistice has not dispelled doubts about the future of this peninsula. Fighting has ceased in Korea, but peace is not yet in sight. It will not dawn on Korea without a settlement of the political issues involved. This is the task of the forthcoming Political Conference. There is widespread apprehension that the Conference may fail to reach any agreed solution as the problems involved are so delicate. Diplomacy demands that both sides to the dispute should refrain from taking any action which may complicate the issues further. Though the Communists have not been guilty of any breach of this diplomatic attitude, Washington has announced at least two decisions which are likely to prejudice the outcome of the Conference.

Under the armistice agreement, the agenda of the Conference has been indicated, but it has not been definitely defined. It would have been wise for America to maintain discreet silence on this issue. But Mr Dulles has been as vocal as combative on this problem. Washington has repeatedly declared that the question of Red China's admission to the United Nations is not a legitimate item on the agenda of the Conference. It is one thing to suggest that the immediate task of the Conference is to discuss the Korean issues. But America's emphatic declaration of her opposition to Communist China's admission to the United Nations is an irrelevant, but deliberate, intrusion by Mr Dulles, which can only minimise the prospects of the Conference. Both Britain and India agree that Korean issues must be discussed fully. But both are equally agreed that Communist China must be admitted to the United Nations.

So delicate and fluid are the issues to be settled by the Conference that those member-States who are concerned about peace in Korea are agreed that the agenda and the proceedings of the Con-

ference should be as flexible as possible. Mr Dulles has not only offered an uncalled for provocation by his undiplomatic reiteration of America's reluctance to admit Communist China to the United Nations. He has also embarrassed America's NATO allies by entering into an agreement with Rhee that America will stage a "concurrent withdrawal" from the Conference if it fails to make satisfactory progress in ninety days after its start. In Korea, neither the Communists nor the United Nations have succeeded in reaching a decisive military conclusion. In the circumstances, it is, to say the least, undesirable for one of the combatants to make any attempt at dictation to the other side.

Far more disturbing is the Dulles-Rhee pact which entitles America to station troops in and around Korea. As the armistice agreement is drafted, the agenda of the Conference has not been precisely fixed. But in so far as it has been enunciated, it specifically includes the problem of "withdrawal of all foreign forces" from Korea. This problem is clearly related with the question of unification of Korea. It is arguable that this issue is not likely to be solved as long as Syngman Rhee insists on Korean unity under his regime. As in Germany, the only solution to the problem is to hold "free and fair" general elections throughout the peninsula. But the Communists will be entitled to demand that an all-Korean election cannot be held without the removal of all foreign troops. One of the most difficult tasks of the Conference will be to find out whether a formula can be resolved for the maintenance of UN forces for conducting a "free and fair" election. It is evident that the composition of such UN forces will have to be entirely different from that of the UN Command to persuade the Communists to accept the suggestion. But there is not the least shadow of any doubt that the Communists will never agree to stationing of American troops in and around Korea. By concluding such a pact with South Korea, America has made the complicated problem of unification of Korea far more intricate.

If America's policy to Korea and the Far East remains an obstacle to lasting peace in this region, Mr Dulles has succeeded in coercing Britain and France to abandon their eager desire to pursue Sir Winston's

policy of a conference of the heads of leading Powers. "Little Bermuda" has sabotaged Bermuda, and, with it, the prospects of a negotiated settlement of world disputes. Both Britain and France hoped that the Bermuda meeting would pave the way for a four-Power Conference. Instead, "Little Bermuda" has issued a request to Russia to join a Foreign Ministers' conference on Germany.

Two-and-a-half years ago Russia proposed such a conference on Germany. This proposal was rejected by the Western Powers on the ground that Germany could not be discussed in isolation, and that the main item on the agenda of such a conference should be the wider reasons for the prevailing world tension. This time, the Western Powers have proposed a conference on Germany alone. Unlike the Western Powers, Russia has not rejected the proposal, but she has replied that world peace cannot be established without a settlement of the wider issues responsible for the world tension. Russia has paid the Western Powers back in their own coin. But she has regained the diplomatic initiative by making a counter-proposal instead of rejecting outright the Western Powers' proposal for a four-Power meeting on Germany.

It is not difficult to appreciate the reasons for the unfavourable response among the Western Powers to the Russian counter-proposal. Washington may not feel it, but London and Paris seem to be suffering from a guilty conscience. Sir Winston's call for a meeting of the leading Powers raised high hopes that the "cold war" might be liquidated. In the absence of Sir Winston's vigorous leadership due to his illness, Mr Dulles has succeeded in cajoling his opposite numbers in Britain and France to accept his foreign policy. And Mr Dulles's foreign policy is, if it is to be judged by results, to continue the "cold war". Cynics will suggest that the Western Powers have acquired a Vested interest in the "cold war" as its end may hasten a global economic crisis. But there is a greater danger that "cold war" cannot be allowed to continue for long without leading to a world war. If it is Moscow's policy to demonstrate to the world that this is the real intention of America, it could not find more obliging allies than Mr Dulles and his aggressive foreign policy.