domestic savings.

LEON PODKAMINER

I

n 1990, after a decade of disintegration which, at its end, bordered on hyperinflation, Poland’s “planned economy” based on state ownership of the means of production was put to rest. An IMF-sponsored shock therapy brought about, within a short period, a market economy. Extensive, if at times chaotic, privatisation of firms and banks started. Private economic activities were legalised, prices freed, and shortages eliminated. Foreign trade was fully liberalised and tariff rates were drastically reduced. Following a dramatic devaluation, the exchange rate of the domestic currency, the zloty, was fixed and made internally convertible. The currency was convertible on almost all current account transactions. Importers had unrestricted access to foreign exchange. But capital account transactions were not liberalised. The restrictions practically prohibited official exports of capital. Then, the residents were obliged to repatriate and then sell their hard currency holdings to the state. The use of the Polish

currency for invoicing and making payments in foreign trade was not allowed.

The excessive fiscal squeeze and inordinately high interest rates imposed by the central bank, which were part and parcel of the initial stages of the shock therapy, had only a weak impact on inflation, which slowed down only sluggishly. By contrast, production and employment fell precipitously right away and then continued a downward drift for 30 months – cumulatively depressing real GDP by 20 per cent. In 1990, foreign trade played a positive role as the undervalued currency contributed to high trade and current account surpluses. But in 1991, as continuing inflation had finally resulted in high real overvaluation, large trade and current account deficits appeared.

1992-95

The new policy that was launched in 1992 responded with devaluation and very high tariffs and other protectionist measures (including selective subsidisation of exports). Then there was a change in the exchange rate regime, substituting a preannounced sliding peg for the fixed one. Regular devaluation was linked to inflation so that real appreciation was effectively contained.

The illiberal policy initiated in 1992 proved spectacularly successful. It generated a sustained recovery over the years 1992-95, with an average annual GDP growth of 5 per cent. Fixed investment rose at 10 per cent pa, inflation and unemployment kept falling, and public finances were broadly balanced. The trade and current accounts improved. A handsome surplus on the current account was generated in 1994, followed by a huge one in 1995. Thus, the economy pulled itself out of the “transitional recession” on its own – without incurring new foreign debt and without selling its assets to foreigners.

The real success of that period had much to do with the fact that Poland had not, until 1995, for various seasons, been a target for capital inflows. In the early 1990s, the intensity of international capital movements was, in general, quite low, partly on account of the recent crises (including the turbulent collapse of the first version of the European Monetary System). Moreover, the reputation of the former Soviet bloc countries was very low at that time. Some of them (the former Yugoslav republics, the Baltic countries, the successor states of former Czechoslovakia) were still in the process of state-building. All of them were considered risky, unstable places facing an unknown future. Poland’s reputation was particularly low because the country had defaulted on its huge public foreign debt (already in 1982). The restrictions on capital movements, though aimed primarily at preventing capital exports rather than imports, were not improving the country’s standing. In these circumstances, the fact that nominal interest rates in Poland were still very high (inflation receding only gradually) did not – for several years – induce any significant capital inflows.

In the end, though, Poland fell victim to its own success. Actually, by 1994-95 Poland was the only “success case” among the former Soviet bloc countries. As such, it was becoming the darling of the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank), western governments, and finally of the international business community, which eventually appreciated Poland’s performance. Consequently, Poland was richly rewarded: first with generous treaties on the reduction and rescheduling of its

Economic and Political Weekly May 13, 2006

foreign debt (1994), followed by the conclusion of the agreement on association with the European Union and admittance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). On its part, Poland accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF statutes on full current account convertibility (June 1995). Besides, it pledged to dismantle, gradually, its trade protectionist scaffolding. This was soon followed by a whole series of further steps partially liberalising capital transactions: exporters were no longer obliged to convert their revenues into the domestic currency; residents (and domestic firms) were allowed to invest some (still limited) amounts in other OECD countries; domestic firms were permitted to engage in medium-term foreign exchange credit contracts with non-residents; the OECD set of regulations on foreign direct investment was adopted. Most importantly, already in 1995 the access to the short-term treasury bills market was opened to non-residents.

In 1995 Poland’s official reserves rose abruptly, more than doubling, to over $ 14.5 billion. Only part of the increase in reserves was due to the high current account surplus. For the first time the country experienced high inflows of foreign direct investment, private portfolio capital and credits drawn by the private sector. Capital inflows were only natural, given the reduced levels of risks/uncertainty, the predictability of Poland’s exchange rate (the pre-announced sliding peg) and the very high nominal levels of domestic interest rates (corresponding to inflation, running at about 25 per cent in 1995). The sudden overabundance of foreign exchange did not bring down interest rates on credits denominated in domestic currency. Rather, these interest rates were actually increased as the National Bank of Poland (the central bank) attempted to sterilise the inflows by “mopping up” the excess liquidity accumulating in the commercial banking system. The sterilisation, which was quite costly, was only partially successful as it did not completely prevent a credit boom fuelling private consumption and investment. On the other hand, increased domestic interest rates induced even higher capital inflows. Very soon the National Bank saw no other way out but to allow the currency to float, within some bounds, around the “central parity”, on the inter-bank forex market. Nominal appreciation followed immediately. Shortly afterwards the National Bank had to revalue the central parity even further. This alone produced huge gains to foreign speculators. The floating, which was to deter excessive short-term speculation by making it more risky, was outsmarted by the market, which quickly developed instruments allowing speculation all the same (first futures, then swaps and then more sophisticated currency and interest rate derivatives). The major players on the still rather shallow Polish forex financial markets were (and still are) the London-based traders gambling against Polish market participants (including the Treasury and the National Bank). It may be added that, as long as Polish interest rates were very high, the short-term speculation was not against the Polish currency. Such speculation was (and still is) potentially too costly. Under high interest rates speculation tends to inflate the value of the domestic currency – irrespective of its “fundamental value”. Conversely, speculation may tend to force an excessive weakening of the currency if domestic interest rates are believed to be too low.

1996-2005

The policy changes, initiated in 1995 continued to unfold.

formally aiming at controlling inflation only. This culminated in the adoption of inflation targeting already in 1998. But inflationary pressures calmed slowly all the same. Continuing capital inflows made it possible for the banks to expand lending even if that collided with the intentions of the National Bank. In effect, domestic interest rates have been excessively high most of the time, leading to periodical high tides of foreign capital, “artificially” strengthening the currency. It may be added that the real interest rates on credit denominated in domestic currency had been very high (in excess of 10 per cent) from 1996 until 2004. (By contrast, real interest rates were very low, quite often close to being negative, until mid-1995). The problem monetary policy faced was (and essentially still is) that a rise in the interest rate meant to slow down credit growth was, at the same time, inducing higher inflows, which supported credit expansion. Conversely, cuts in interest rates meant to reduce capital inflows tend to strengthen credit expansion. Only occasionally, when major currency crises afflicted other “emerging markets” (as in mid-1996, in December 1997 and in September 1998) could monetary policy control domestic credit and inflation with a greater degree of efficiency. On such occasions, the domestic currency usually weakened, though never enough to eliminate the excessive real overvaluation that had accumulated since 1995.

The year 1995 was a turning point as far as the depth and scope of currency convertibility is concerned. At the same time, that year marked a change in monetary and exchange rate policies. Eclectic monetary policies, adjusting their goals to the varying requirements of the moment, were no longer possible. In particular, monetary policy had to abdicate its responsibility for stabilising the exchange rate. The change of policy paradigms has had definite and, on the whole, rather negative consequences.

First of all, strong real appreciation had immediate effects on foreign trade performance and the current account. Already in 1996 exports slowed down while imports expanded explosively. Within one year the trade surplus of 2.4 per cent of GDP turned into a deficit of 4.3 per cent. The current account surpluses of previous years were replaced by large deficits. Under continuing capital inflows and the resultant currency appreciation the current account deficits kept rising until early 2000 when they approached 9 per cent of the GDP. Interestingly, until 2001 (and also more

Economic and Political Weekly May 13, 2006 recently) capital inflows overcompensated the current account deficits.

Summing Up

There are two distinct periods in Poland’s recent history, differing as far as the levels of external liberalisation are concerned. The first may be dated as 1992-95. The second started in 1995-96 and has not yet ended.

During the first period, imports were controlled through tariffs and other instruments, while exports were promoted through subsidies. Appreciation of the currency was controlled via a managed nominal exchange rate, which was possible under a rather illiberal approach to capital movements. Real interest rates were moderate. There was an acceleration of capital formation. The economy pulled itself out of a deep recession without incurring any new foreign debt – and without selling out its assets to foreigners.

During the second period, there has been a steady and rapid liberalisation of imports and a discontinuation of subsidisation of exports. More importantly, capital inflows were liberalised all along

– which paradoxically failed to bring down domestic interest rates. In fact, the high, essentially uninvited, capital inflows were responsible (via sterilisation operations) for the persistence of very high domestic interest rates. Moreover, under high capital inflows, there has been a tendency towards strong real appreciation, and this has impaired first exports and then overall growth.

In conventional stories there is a “causality” running from high growth through high trade deficits to high compensatory capital inflows. Or, as it is often maintained, high-growth countries need “imports of foreign savings” – and this seems unimaginable without freedom of capital movements. Poland’s experience does not support that story at all. In Poland’s case the high growth in the illiberal years did not generate any need for “imports of foreign savings”, or foreign capital. And, it turned out that foreign capital started to arrive in large quantities, upon being allowed to do so, precisely when it was not at all needed. Moreover, soon after arriving, the uninvited capital in fact impaired growth in the host country. The impairment took the form of undue currency appreciation, which in turn damaged the external competitiveness of the host country, producing high trade deficits. It was the influx of “foreign savings” which eventually crowded out, or suppressed, domestic savings. Only then, after impairing the host country’s ability to generate high savings, may the inflow of foreign capital prove desirable, or even necessary. But, paradoxically, precisely then such capital may be reluctant to come. Or, it may just then show a propensity to extract high payments for the past “services”. m

Email: podkaminer@wiiw.ac.at