The target of saffron terror is not the Muslim community, but “secular nationalism”. The ideology of secular nationalism, with its inclusivity and pluralistic vision – which includes religious diversity and equality – is a serious threat to the project of homogeneity which is undertaken by the Sangh parivar. Therefore, the so-called “splinter groups” are not radical deviations from the Right-wing party line; they are the active and militant extensions of their larger parent organisations in the Sangh parivar.

Juli Gittinger (juli.gittinger@mail.mcgill.ca) is with the Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

I

As Jaffrelot and Maheshwari (2011) discussed in a recent article, the pervasive image of India as democratic, embracing the western-styled aspects of modernity and secularism, is in peril from the “growing ideology of majoritarianism”. The recent fallout from what now appears to be indisputable evidence of Hindu terrro rist organisations, located within the collective of the Sangh parivar, has put groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on the defensive.1 While these investigations will continue to unfold in months ahead, I would like to discuss the larger picture of current Hindu nationalism and the effects of this evidence coming to light.

The question worth asking at this point is: Is “saffron terrorism”2 a splinter or a

centrist and secular ideologies? It may be difficult to say with any accuracy, since even within single organisations there is often dissent regarding what Hindutva represents and how best to use it for the party’s platform (if at all). The only thing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the RSS, and other members of the Sangh parivar seem to agree on is that saffron terror is a myth, and to even suggest such a thing is patently anti-Indian.

As an organisation, the RSS seems to have a narrow spectrum of political ideologies, certainly not as superficially-moderat e as the BJP, who have made great efforts to redefine Hindutva as “cultural nationalism”. For these efforts, the RSS has criticised the BJP of pedalling “soft Hindutva”. Even so, the RSS’ tendrils seem to exten d from Rightwing to radical. There is an air of “the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing” when it comes to violence such as the bombings at Malegaon, Mecca masjid, or of the blast in the Samjhauta Express – all three incidents which have produced forensic evidence linking the terrorist acts to Hindu groups, and not the Students Islami c Movement of India or the Lashkar-e-Toiba as originally thought.

As Jaffrelot points out, the RSS frequently disavows the use of violence as an effective

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means of operating. This denial is made in spite of its long history of subversive acts for which it has been banned, starting with connections to Gandhi’s assassi nation (1948), during Emergency in India (1975), and the instigation of the Babri masjid destruction in 1992 (though in each case, they petitioned to be re instated). Additionally, they have held tight to the Hindutva ideology, which describes a history of transgressions against the Hindus by Muslims.

Despite the tendency to imbue Hinduism with romanticised qualities of benevolence, it should be no shock that there is such a thing as Hindu terrorism. As Juergensmeyer (2003) has made evident in repeated essays and volumes, no religion, no singular dogma, is immune to radicalism and subsequent violence. It could be argued that Hindu terrorism is not religious violence, but political (another reason I am partial to the non-religious label of saffron). However, I think Juer gensmeyer’s discussions are relevant here since religion enters the discussion through the portal of secularism; a secular nationalism can be viewed as “a suprareligion of its own” (Juergensmeyer 2009) attempting to be as compelling an idea as a sacred one. This contributes the popular concept of Hinduism as an inherently “secular religion”.

‘Who Is a Hindu?’

Perhaps the question as to whether growing radicalism is a “splinter or symptom” points to a larger question of which forms of nationalism are struggling to dominate the Indian political arena. There seem to be two which are at the centre of these concerns: secular nationalism and religious nationalism. The first comes from a decade of conflating “Hindu” with “secular” – not only in the re-appropriations of Hindutva as cultural nationalism as the BJP has promulgated, but among academic scholarship as well. It is true that the move from post-Enlightenment definitions of secularism (that is, the “separation of church and state”) have fallen by the wayside, in favour of a model such as Taylor’s which relies on tolerance, diversity, and pluralism. Such models, however, have been found in Indian religiopolitical theory for some time. Scholars such as Rajeev Bhargava (1998) pointed out over a decade ago that the separation-of-church-and-state paradigm

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had no currency in India since there was no church in the singular orthodox sense and, therefore, secularism in India was its own particular model. This model, however, has now become the rule rather than the exception, as modern secularist discourses stress tolerance as a key facet with an urgency which rises in the wake of the 9/11 incidents.

Secular nationalism, therefore, has taken up V D Savarkar’s query, “Who is a Hindu?”3 and answered it with something resembling Jawaharlal Nehru’s universalistic ideas of India rather than Savarkar’s ethno-nationalist ideal. In other words, under this rubric, to be Hindu is to be pluralistic, tolerant, diverse, and non-aggressive .4 It therefore defines “Hindu” as opposite of the archetypal “Muslim” – imperialistic, theocratic, intolerant, and having a history of aggression against India – thus, the model of secular is constituted by what it is not. As such, it becomes an inviolable facet of Indianness, a mark of modernity and superiority, and thereby sacralised in its own way. As Juergensmeyer suggests, secular nationalism becomes as compelling as religious nationalism, and thus needs to be defended and protected.

Religious nationalism, on the other hand, bears more resemblance to Savarkar’s ethno-nationalist model, although in positioning itself as anti-Muslim it unavoidably resonates as “religiously Hindu”. Religious nation alism in India tends to promote a narrow depiction of Hindu religious tradition, rallying around outwardly religious issues (such as the Ram Janma bhoomi movement) as a guise for anti- heterogeneity. Utilising discursive tactics similar to those found in fascist and Nazi propaganda, the RSS in particular has been successful in disseminating such ideas through nationalist literature or patrioti c organisations such as their shakhas (youth training camps).

I suggest that there are three reasons as to why saffron terror, such as that which occurred in Malegaon, would be the preferred strategy by religious nationalists. The first is the idea of defending the “nation” from the “other”. India has a history of being invaded and occupied by various peoples over the centuries, ending with the British raj; as an independent country, India is not yet a century old. Girded by this history of India as victims of repeated aggression, which Savarkar crystallised in his 1923 treatise Hindutva – Who Is a Hindu?, actions against the Muslims are rendered as justified. Therefore, “retaliatory” acts of violence are legiti mated as merely a part of a long conversation of conflict that has been going on for centuries.

This “defensive posture” is the primary reason as to why Hindu terrorism has increased; as Aseemanand stated in his confession, the modus operandi of his organisation was “bomb ka jawab bomb se dena chahiye (we will answer bombs with bombs)”.5 Post 9/11, Islam has become

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inextricabl y linked with senseless violence, and the fear of terrorist organisations such as Al Qaida are arguably quite real and understandable – especially given India’s tumultuous relationship with neigh bouring Pakistan. Yet the default position of “not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists seem to be Muslim”6 neatly fits the historical discourses and therefore perpetuates a notion of “do it to them before they do it to us”.

The second reason for instigating violence – and making it appear to be by Muslims through emulation of Islamic terrorist methods (Jaffrelot and Maheswari 2011) – is to create an arena in which overt violence against Muslims is legitimated through the first reason (self-defence, responsive). Notice that, unlike most Muslim terrorist groups, Hindu terrorists are not eager to claim their deeds or make demands; these acts are intended to be a subterfuge, to enlarge communal divisions rather than mollify them, and to allow for retaliation. This would suggest an almost kuta-yuddha tactic7 in which saffron terror takes the indirect method to instigate violence upon their enemies.

The third reason for such terrorist acts, particularly incidents which look like a radical Muslim group attacking their own mosque, is that they underscore a discourse of irrational and violent behaviour from which Islam has been unable to disengage. This may be the most subtle yet insidious after-effect of these acts. Reifying this particular narrative of “Islam = violence” allows for “Hindu” to be posited as the superior culture, and therefore legitimating its priority over any other minority religion in India. In this form of nationalism, “Hindu” would be synonymous with Indian, and to be Indian would therefore mean prioritising Indian identity over other (religious) identities, thereby allowing the abolition of Muslim personal law and minority reservations.

Weighing the two possibilities of “splinter” or “symptom” it is imperative to under stand what or who is under attack. I would conclude that it is not the Muslim community that is under attack: the target of saffron terror is secular nationalism. The ideology of secular nationalism, with its inclusivity and pluralistic vision (which includes religious diversity and equality) is a serious threat to the project of homogeneity which is undertaken by the Sangh parivar. Therefore, the so-called “splinter groups” are not radical deviations from the right wing party line; they are the active and militant extensions of their larger parent organisations, acting fully within the doctrine laid out in RSS or Viswa Hindu Parishad propaganda. Their goal is to undermine any version of Hindu nationalism which may be inclusive.

Declarations by Hindutva supporters which state that the words “Hindu” and “terrorism” are incompatible are ignoring the facts at hand and the broader statement that any ideology can be twisted into radicalism and violence, and legitimated through arguments of cultural vigilance. If secular nationalism and the reclaiming of Hindutva as “cultural nationalism” is to prevail, then Hindu nationalist groups must accept the reality that looms before them and denounce both speech and actions which fuel communal divisions and violence. Denying involvement in an act of Hindu terror shows disapproval of such actions; denying the existence of Hindu terror is to be complicit in a lie which states that terrorism is synonymous with Islam, and as such, should be dealt with equal voracity.

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Notes

1 “RSS Launches Awareness Campaign”, The Hindu, 2 February 2011 (accessed in May 2011, http:// www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp- andhrapradesh/article1148316.ece).

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh on Tuesday launched “Jana Jagaran Udhimam” to repulse the alleged “sinister” campaign by some political partie s to brand the RSS as an organisation with terror links. Purva Andhra Seva Pramukh Murali Krishna, who launched the campaign in the town, told reporters that “the door-to-door campaign is to remove any misunderstanding among people in the wake of alleged vilification campaign by the ruling Congress and some other parties to tarnish the image of the RSS, a social service organisation”.

2 While I know that the term “Saffron Terror” is despised by the Sangh parivar, I find this far preferable to the “Jihadi Hinduism” and “Talibanisation of Hindutva” that often occurs in Indian media, as the latter places the blame on Islam in a post hoc ergo propter hoc fashion. Such terms are pure propaganda as they insinuate that the Taliban is the antithesis to the ideal of Hindu culture, therefore Islam can influence or infect Indian culture, and must be limited (or eliminated).

3 V D Savarkar wrote the seminal treatise on Hindu identity, Hindutva – Who Is a Hindu? (1923) thereby coining the neo-logism “Hindutva” (meaning “Hinduness”) and defining Hindu as an ethno-nationalis t category which requires not only the Arya n-Harappan bloodline, but that one’s holyland or fatherland cannot lie outside of India (thereby excluding Mecca, Palestine, and Rome as valid holylands) for one to truly be part of the Hindu rashtra or Hindu nation.

4 India is proud of its history as haven for the displaced (Parsees, Jews, Zoroastrians) rather than conqueror or aggressor (as with Mughals, Mongols, Turks, British).

5 Ashish Khetan (2011) “In the Words of a Zealot”, Tehelka (January) 8:2. Bal Thackeray has also been quoted as suggesting similar sentiments: “Islamic terrorism is growing and Hindu terrorism is the only way to counter it. We need suicide bomb squads to protect India and Hindus” (See “Politicians Indulge in Hate Speech with Impunity ”, 19 June 2008, CNN-IBN, 7 April 2009).

6 This was a controversial statement made on a US Talk Radio Network show in October 2008 by conservative host of The Savage Nation, Michael Savage.

7 According to the Kautilya’s Arthashastra, there are three kinds of war in Hinduism: dharma-yuddha or “just war”, nyaya-yuddha or “honest/direct

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war”, and kuta-yuddha or “indirect/unethica l war”. In the last type, one employs “dirty tactics” such as subterfuge, poison, ambush, or – as I would suggest here – indirect attacks which enable pogroms and more overt violence to occur under the guise of dharma-yuddha.

References

Bhargava, Rajeev (1998): Secularism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press).

Jaffrelot, Christophe and Malvika Maheshwari (2011): “Paradigm Shifts by the RSS? Lessons from Aseemanand’s Confession”, Economic Political Weekly, XLVI: 6, pp 42-46.

Juergensmeyer, Mark (2003): Terror in the Mind of God (revised edition) (Berkeley: University of California Press).

– (2009): Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 12.

Taylor, Charles (2007): A Secular Age (Boston: Harvard University Press).

– (2011): “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism” in Jürgen Habermas, Judith Butler, et al, The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (Columbia University Press).

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