1 Theoretical Framework

To understand disparity, development perspectives and processes need to be analysed. Development has inter alia three important determinants – the resource base, levels of technological applications, and economic relations and their corresponding s uperstructure in a given time and space. Variations in these elements have not been uniform across the globe for historical reasons and horizontal and vertical disparities in resources, relations of production and productive forces, and hegemonic roles were inevitable outcomes. Dominance and subordination made a significant difference in the region-specific status of an economy and its implications on quality of life. The basis of uneven distribution has been examined with different contours of theoretical currents and perspectives. Classical economists relied mainly on supply side theories and natural endowment was identified as one of the major resources for absolute advantage and development. However, Ricardo treated differentials in distribution of endowment as a niggardliness of nature and therefore, comparative advantage for the movement of goods and services. This continued until productive forces acquired the capacity of mobility through inventions and discoveries, culminating in the industrial revolution as one of the dominant factors rejecting space constraints for location-specific development. The dominant forces of development exploited resources, technologies and labour for their benefit. The state was not involved in development directly until the Keynesian theory of effective demand emerged as a guiding principle to get rid of the great depression of the 1930s. The great depression gave the state a proactive role, that of facilitating industry through enhancing the purchasing power of the common people and generating effective demand for large-scale industrial production. Regional perspectives of the development discourse were seen in the writings of Myrdal (1957) and H irschman (1958), suggesting cumulative causation and core p eriphery models, which were elaborated upon by Kaldor (1960), Friedmann (1966, 1973), Perroux (1950) and Bouderville (1966). They were of the view that regional imbalances were likely to widen in the absence of state intervention and narrow with p olitically necessary interventions, till finally the periphery b ecomes a beneficiary of the external economies of the core ( Williamson 1965). Thus the state assumed a significant role in development strategies and public investment occupied i mportant place.

Unlike this stream of analysis, Karl Marx and Marxists analysed development through modes of surplus generation and appropriation towards linear transformation from one mode of

EPW

*Includes Reserved Funds and Deposits. Source: Finance accounts of UP and Budget Document 2004-05 cited in UP HDR 2003.

p roduction to another, that is, primitive to feudal, capitalist, s ocialist and communist. Here, productive forces and relations of production change, determining the dimensions of horizontal and vertical equity and disparities. However, the linear basis of transformation was contested later by western Marxists on the basis of empirical evidence which suggested multiple layers of sub-structures within structure, which were not necessarily consistent with the broader outer layer of structure. Therefore, r egion-specific relations of production and development of productive forces assumed significance in understanding modes of surplus generation and appropriation towards advanced modes of production. This had an important bearing on locating an individual in the process of production, exchange, distribution and consumption, where poor nations, regions and households were left deprived. The political economy of regional development thus took a critical view of the bourgeois state as a development actor. In the discourse of dependency theorists (Baran 1957; Frank 1967; Santos 1979; Timberlake 1987), the development of the centre at the cost of the periphery occupied significant place. Lipton (1982) identified urban biases in the development a pproach as the main actor in widening regional disparities. They argued that industrially advanced nations and regions of the world developed and consumed at the cost of resources and s urpluses exploited from many developing and underdeveloped nations and regions. It was also argued that the capitalist path of development had inherent characteristics of uneven growth b ecause it followed the principles of profit-biased investment to exploit resources.

Adapting this framework of analysis to the Indian scenario suggests that regional disparities widened under British colonial rule as investment was focused on developing an infrastructure to create markets for industrial production, to carry out raw m aterial from India, and to maintain military control over the colonial administration. A pioneering exercise by Dadabhai Naoroji provided a systematic account of draining of resources from India that caused deprivation and poverty among the masses. Another account by Dutt (1940) provided a sharper analysis of colonial exploitation. Even after independence, horizontal and vertical disparity have been concerns of development experts and policymakers, which led to the introduction of the concept of micro planning in development strategies and many initiatives to reduce disparities and inequalities.

Recent studies suggest that there is little evidence of any convergence taking place among the states in India in the post-reform period. The evidence points at divergence rather than c onvergence (Noorbakhsh 2003). Dreze and Sen (1995) found remarkable diversity in economic and social development among the Indian states. Referring to major states in India, Datt and Ravallion (1998: 34) concluded that endowment of physical infrastructure and human resources appeared to have played a major role in poverty reduction, and in another study (Datt and Ravallion 1993: 91) found that disparities in living standards among regions and between the urban and rural sectors had long raised concern in India. Another cross-state study (Ravallion and Datt 2002) of poverty in 15 major states in India concluded that the substantial difference of the elasticity of poverty index to non-farm output between the state with the lowest elasticity, B ihar, and the state with the highest, Kerala, was due to the difference in literacy rates between these states.

2 Intra-Regional Development Disparities

Intra-regional disparities in development can be identified through macro indicators of development, allocation of resources and quality of governance. The overall growth rate of the net d omestic product (NDP) of the country, which was 5.52% during 1980-81 to 1990-91, came down to 5.02% between 1993-94 and 2003-04. Studies suggest that interstate regional inequalities in India in terms of state domestic product (SDP) and per capita income increased significantly between the 1980s and 1990s (Bhattacharya and Sakthivel 2004). In the case of UP, the growth rate of NSDP has come down from 4.95% to 3.76%. Its position among

Table 5: Party-wise Tenure of Chief Ministers and President’s Rule in UP

*Denotes frequency of President’s Rules and $ indicates up to 31 July 2008. Figures in parentheses indicate actual number of leaders.

the states in terms of growth rates was seventh in the 1980s but it has now come down to 12th. The plan-wise annual compound growth rates at constant prices calculated by the planning d epartment of the government suggest that the economy of the state grew by 3.84% against a national average of 4.96% and per capita income by 1.82% against a national average of 2.88% ( Table 1, p 265). Barring the Fifth and Sixth Plans, UP’s economy has lagged behind the national average. During the Sixth Plan, the state achieved its highest growth rate of 8.7%. However, this could not be sustained in subsequent plans. Similarly, the rate of growth of per capita NSDP registered 6.3% during the Sixth Plan, which rolled back and turned negative during the Ninth Plan. The average growth rate of state income during the 10th Plan was higher than that of the Eighth and Ninth Plans, but still lower than the national growth rate. Agriculture in UP could grew only 2.71% and manufacturing by 5.2% while the tertiary sector could grow by only 4.5% (GoUP 2007:5). The sectoral contribution to

june 27, 2009 vol xliv nos 26 & 27

SDP has been d isproportionate to the size of the sectoral labour force. The share of the primary sector has gradually declined to 33%. The share of agriculture in SDP has declined to 31% though about 66% of the workforce is dependent on agriculture. Nonagricultural sectors contributed 64% of SDP but could hardly accommodate 34% of the workforce. This implies a widening ruralurban gap and regional disparities within the state.

The coefficient of variation for triennium ending (TE) average per capita income among the districts during TE 1993-94 at c onstant prices for UP as a whole was 0.532. The variation for TE 2003-04 came down to 0.406. Examining intra-regional variations in the TE average of district-level per capita income suggest high inequality in distribution of income among different regions (Table 2, p 265). During TE 1993-94, the highest variation was found in the eastern region followed by the western and B undelkhand regions. The central region had the lowest variation. During TE 2003-04, disparities among the districts in distribution of income came down in all the regions except the central region, where disparities increased from 0.261 in TE 1993-94 to

0.561 in TE 2003-04.

The per capita plan expenditure in UP increased significantly from Rs 25 in the First Plan to Rs 3,595 in the 10th Plan but Punjab spent Rs 7,678. The sector-wise plan expenditure suggests that allocation for rural reconstruction could not be continued uniformly (GoUP 2007: 85-86). Agriculture lost ground from the s econd plan and received a stagnant proportion from the Seventh to Ninth Plans, with a decline in the 10th Plan (Table 3, p 265). Similarly irrigation received a declining proportion of allocation since the Sixth Plan with a few exceptions. The power sector received an increasing share in plan expenditure up to the Fifth Plan but it later declined. During the 10th Plan, except economic and social infrastructure, the proportion of expenditure for all other sectors has declined as the fiscal health of the state is stagnating.

The fiscal profile is one of the most crucial determinants of growth initiatives. The state receives financial resources from its own tax and non-tax revenues and transfers from the centre. An examination of the last one and a half decades suggests that the own tax revenue of UP was almost stagnant in the 1990s and that there was a marginal increase in 2002-03. The non-tax revenue was very small and that witnessed a declining share. The proportion of interest payment went up and capital expenditure d eclined. Revenue and fiscal deficit increased during the 1990s and outstanding debt reached 50% of the GSDP (Table 4, p 266). The central transfer ratio to GSDP declined significantly. Although there was a sign of recovery in the ratio of central transfer in 2002-03, it was still lower than that of 1987-88. Moreover, central plan assistance as a percentage of total plan expenditure declined sharply in 2002-03. The ratio marginally improved in subsequent years. The Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) recommended a 19.26% share of central taxes, which was marginally different from the recommendation of the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC), 19.14%. However, the overall share of low income states, that is, UP, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal, and Bihar turned negative due to a change in the formula between the EFC and TFC (Das and Mishra 2009: 15).

Resources aside, quality governance is important for faster growth with justice. The failure of land reforms is one of the crucial indicators of the quality of governance, which has reflected the class character of administrations. Political will and transparency in the delivery mechanisms of various development programmes are the basic requirements of quality governance. In a democratic state with a multiparty system, the stability of the

ernment have a significant impact on development Chart 1: Intra-Regional Distribution of Ownership of Holdings in UP 2003-04

0 50 100

Landless Marginal farmer Small farmer Semi medium Medium Large

Chart 2: Percentage Distribution of Operational Holdings in UP in 2003-04

0 20 40 60 80

No

Area

No

Area

No

Area

No

Area

No

Area

Landless Marginal farmer Small farmer Semi medium Medium Large

june 27, 2009 vol xliv nos 26 & 27

Food Non-Food Total MPCE Index CPIAL Index

27th 32.16 (72.9) 12.01 (27.1) 44.17 (100) 100 100

32nd 44.33 (64.3) 24.56 (35.7) 68.89 (100) 156 144

38th 73.63 (65.6) 38.68 (34.4) 112.31 (100) 255 277

43rd 100.82 (64.0) 57.28 (36.0) 158.10 (100) 358 289

50th 177.80 (63.2) 103.60 (36.8) 281.40 (100) 637 520

55th 288.80 (59.4) 197.36 (40.6) 486.16 (100) 1100 833

61st 307.60 (55.0) 251.19 (45.0) 558.78 (100) 1265 922

Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of total expenditure. Source: NSS 61st Round, Report No 508, 66.

Table 10: Regional Variation in Average MPCE (Rs) in Uttar Pradesh by Mixed and Uniform Recall Period

Region	Linearised over	95% Confidence Interval
	Mean	Std Err
Rural MPCE 365 days
Western	538.65	6.282477	526.32	550.98
Central	529.71	8.119872	513.77	545.64
Eastern	471.52	3.684795	464.29	478.75
Bundelkand	681.02	22.70204	636.48	725.56
Rural MPCE 30 days
Western	539.93	6.863582	526.47	553.40
Central	524.06	9.035583	506.33	541.79
Eastern	461.90	4.634912	452.80	470.99
Bundelkand	687.40	23.96877	640.37	734.42
Urban MPCE 365
Western	822.41	38.58417	746.60	898.21
Central	945.75	63.07462	821.83	1069.67
Eastern	738.35	35.11305	669.37	807.34
Bundelkand	964.45	75.00713	817.08	1111.81
Urban MPCE 30
Western	818.74	39.07027	741.98	895.50
Central	887.38	49.72921	789.68	985.09
Eastern	702.91	36.4646	631.27	774.56
Bundelkand	1109.48	235.4472	646.90	1572.06

Source: Calculated from Unit Level Data of NSS, Round 61.

lighting. The data suggests that many districts are moving from a higher level of deprivation to lower level except Kanpur Nagar, for which the index has increased from 28% to over 30%. All the districts which had a deprivation index ranging from 71% to 84% during 1991 were transformed to a higher level of development in 2001. Sixteen districts were found in the range of 50% while the remaining 54 districts were still above 50%. Although the 2001 situation may have changed by now, the challenges of providing basic amenities are still alarming and require substantial investment. However, none of these indicators reflect consumption disparities linked to inequality and poverty. The object of this exercise is to identify intra-regional inequality and disparities in UP.

3 Inequality and Poverty

Intra-regional inequality in UP can be examined through three indicators, agrarian structure, particularly ownership and operational distribution of landholdings, income and consumption patterns and estimates of poverty. This section attempts to deal with these three indicators at the regional and sub-regional levels.

(a) Agrarian Structure

The agrarian structure in India was reshaped for revenue farming during the Mughal rule. With the coming of the British, a grarian relations were further recast for better revenue

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

c ollection (Raychoudhuri and Habib 1982). Broadly three experiments were introduced – permanent settlement in Bihar, Bengal, Orissa and the eastern part of UP, ryotwari in Madras province and later Bombay and the central provinces, and mahalwari in Agra and Oudh, which was later extended to Punjab (Sharma 1992). Thus UP had a mixture of permanent settlement and m ahalwari land revenue system during the British rule. These horizontal institutional arrangements had a significant impact on the vertical distribution of land in India. To maximise revenue collection, intermediaries were given a free hand, which led to aggressive exploitation of the people, aggravating vertical i nequality of land resources.

To address the issues of inequality and poverty, post-independent India initiated many steps such as abolition of the zamindari system, imposition of ceilings and acquisition of surplus land and their redistribution. However, in the absence of effective political will, land reforms could not be implemented to bring about the required changes in property relations. An analysis of the latest data suggests that interstate inequality in ownership of land is still very high (Rawal 2008). The interstate Gini ratio varied from

0.43 to 0.84. Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh were above 0.8. The second highest states were Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal, Bihar and Tripura scoring above 0.7. The Gini ratio for all India was 0.761. UP falls in the third highest level of inequality with a Gini ratio of 0.65 (Table 7, p 268). The Gini ratio of ownership and operational holdings since 1953-54 suggests that the initial decline in inequality because of the abolition of the zamindari system could not be sustained after 1960-61. Vertical inequality in the distribution of ownership holdings in UP is very high. Above 74% of marginal holders have only about 28.7% of the land. The majority of them were below 0.4 hectare, whereas only about 2% of medium and large holders possessed over 19% of the land area.

Table 11: Percentage Distribution of Poverty in India and Uttar Pradesh

Year Percentage of Poverty in UP

Percentage of Poverty in India

Total Poverty Rural %Poverty Total Poverty Rural %Poverty

1957-58 52.3 -53.4

1963-64 56.6 -49.1

1967-68 60.2 -57.9

1973-74 57.07 84.0 54.65 81.31

1977-78 49.05 80.78 51.82 62.10

1983 47.07 80.62 44.40 76.03

1987-88 41.40 79.91 35.80 75.52

1993-94 40.85 98.16 36.0 76.17

1999-2000 31.15 77.75 26.10 74.25

2004-05 30.07 80.54 27.5 73.65

Source: Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.

Table 12: Intra-Regional Percentage Distribution of Official Estimates of Rural Poor Households by Ownership of Land in UP

Occupation/Region Western Central Eastern Bundelkhand UP

Landless 9.71 41.00 39.16 17.74 23.05

Marginal farmer 28.95 32.11 44.05 26.02 36.52

Small farmer 17.72 19.69 21.81 8.57 19.12

Semi-medium 13.24 15.75 12.42 7.07 12.94

Medium 1.51 14.46 15.22 8.64 9.03

Large 0.00 0.00 13.72 17.97 9.07

Total 24.68 27.76 37.96 16.83 30.74

Source: Calculated from 61st Round of NSS data on Consumption.

(b) Consumption Patterns

The latest NSSO data on distribution of households’ monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) suggest that 55% is on food items and 45% on non-food items in rural areas (Table 9, p 269). The consumption pattern in rural India has changed considerably from about 73% on food items and 27% on non-food items in the 27th round, and in urban areas, expenditure on food has fallen from 64% to 42%. Figure 1 suggests that the average MPCE d eclines with the increasing size of households in urban areas. However, the distribution of the MPCE shows no big difference with the size of the household in rural areas. Figures 2R and 2U indicate that more than 60% of the rural population survives b elow the average MPCE level.

Region-wise, the average MPCE suggests that one of the most backward regions, Bundelkhand, irrespective of rural and urban sectors, spent the highest amount, much above the western region followed by the central and eastern regions. An explanation could be that pulses, one of the main staples in the Bundelkhand region, have a higher market value than other cereals. However, variations reflected through values of sd and cv are very high in the Eastern and Bundelkhand regions, which indicate non- significance of their high value of MPCE. These were further verified through linearisation over mean and standard error of MPCE (Table 10, p 269).

(c) Incidence of Poverty

Horizontal disparity aggravates vertical disparity, which is reflected in consumption deficiency and deprivation, and incidence

Figure 1: Average MPCE for Households of Sizes 1 to 8 (in Rs) 2000

1600

1200

Urban

Rural

800

400

0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Household size

Source: NSS Round 61, Report No 508.

Figure 2U: Percentage of Urban Population below Different MPCE Levels

100 ♦♦ 80 ♦ ♦ 60 ♦ ♦ 40 ♦ ♦ 20 ♦ ♦

♦

0♦

| | | | | | |

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 MPCE (Rs)

Source: NSS Round 61, Report No 508.

june 27, 2009 vol xliv nos 26 & 27

60 40 20 0

Western Central Eastern Bundelkhand UP

Official estimates of poor households rural 1993-94

Official estimates of poor households rural 2003-04

Official estimates of poor households urban 1993-94

Official estimates of

poor households urban 2003-04 Source: Prepared from calculated data on Consumption of 61st Round of NSSO, 2004-05.

Chart 4: Intra-Regional Distribution of Rural Poverty by Occupation in UP

80

60

40

20

0

West Central East Bundelkhand Uttar Pradesh Self-employed in non-agriculture

Agricultural labour

Other labours

Self-employed in agriculture

Others

Total

Chart 5: Intra-Regional Distribution of Urban Poverty by Occupation in UP

80

60

40

20

0

West Central East Bundelkhand Uttar Pradesh Self-employed

Regular wage/salary earning

Casual labour

Others

Total

of poverty. This section tries to comprehend intra-regional variations in official estimates of poverty in UP through different d imensions. Data suggest that poverty in UP was over 57% in 1973-74, of which 84% was in rural areas. Overall poverty has declined from 41% in 1993-94 to 30.07% in 2004-05 (Table 11, p 269) but 80% of them still reside in rural areas. The official poverty line for the state in 2004-05 in terms of the MPCE based on 30 days as defined by the planning commission is Rs 365.84 for rural areas and Rs 483.26 for urban areas. The decline in rural poverty was sharp but urban poverty declined marginally. In rural areas, the highest decline was noticed in Bundelkhand, followed by the central region. However, a significant decline across the regions was also witnessed (Chart 3). Intra-regional decline in urban poverty has been slow in the western, central and Bundelkhand regions but it has gone up in the eastern region.

The distribution of the poor by occupational category suggests that in rural areas about 50% of the households in agricultural labour and 46% in other labour were poor in the state as a whole

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

june 27, 2009 vol xliv nos 26 & 27

(Chart 4). The intra-regional variation was very sharp. The e astern region had the highest incidence; above 60% poverty in rural labour households, followed by the central, western and Bundelkhand regions, the last with the lowest of 39%. In urban areas, casual labour households had the highest incidence of p overty. The intra-regional distribution suggests that the highest incidence of poverty among casual labour was in the eastern r egion, followed by Bundelkhand. The distribution of poverty by ownership of land suggests the highest concentration of poor was among the marginal landholders, followed by the landless ( Table 12, p 269). Although poverty was found among all categories of farmers because of increasing risk and non-viability of holdings irrespective of size, among the marginal holders, the eastern r egion was poorer than the other regions. Poverty among the landless was highest in the central region.

While examining poverty by distribution of operational holdings it was found that the highest percentage of poor was from the landless category, followed by small and marginal famers (Table 13, p 270). With landholdings increasing in size, poverty declined except in the eastern and Bundelkhand regions where large f armers were also trapped in poverty. These results suggest that policy initiatives are needed to address the crisis in all the regions. However, the landless and marginal and small farmers should receive priority. Data by a social group suggests that irrespective of regions and sectors, the highest intensity of poverty was among SCs/STs followed by other backward communities (OBCs) and others (Table 14, p 270). Here also, among the regions, the maximum poverty was found in the eastern region.

Official estimates of poverty by religion suggest that there was no difference in the distribution of poverty with respect to r eligion in rural areas. It was almost equally distributed (Table 15, p 270). However intra-regional variations were different. In the eastern region, other minorities were poorer than Hindus and Muslims, and in the central region, Muslims were poorer than Hindus. Unlike rural areas, in urban areas a higher degree of poverty was found among Muslim households, followed by other

Table 16: Division-Wise Intra-Regional Variation in Poverty Estimates in UP

Rural

Urban

Mandal	Poverty	SD	CV%	Poverty	SD	CV%
1	Saharanpur	14.93	35.64	238.71	39.3	48.84	124.27
2	Moradabad	16.05	36.71	228.72	42.98	49.5	115.17
3	Meerut	9.99	29.99	300.20	27.12	44.46	163.94
4	Agra	18.85	39.11	207.48	47.38	49.93	105.38
5	Bareilly	40.01	48.99	122.44	63.89	48.03	75.18
6	Lucknow	28.01	44.91	160.34	52.88	49.92	94.40
7	Kanpur	25.85	43.78	169.36	51.4	49.98	97.24
8	Jhansi	3.75	19	506.67	17.07	37.62	220.39
9	Chitrakootdham	28.41	45.1	158.75	55.13	49.74	90.22
10	Allahabad	31.12	46.3	148.78	61.42	48.68	79.26
11	Faizabad	26.28	44.02	167.50	54.96	49.75	90.52
12	Devipatan	31.32	46.38	148.08	62.97	48.29	76.69
13	Basti	40.65	49.12	120.84	63.53	48.14	75.78
14	Gorakhpur	36.6	48.17	131.61	63.49	48.14	75.82
15	Azamgarh	51.45	49.98	97.14	78.44	41.12	52.42
16	Varanasi	23.5	42.4	180.43	55.3	49.72	89.91
17	Vindhyachal	54.14	49.83	92.04	77.74	41.6	53.51
Source: Calculated from 61st Round of NSS data on Consumption 2004-05.
		271

minorities. Again, poverty among Muslims in urban areas was M aharajganj, B ehraich, Sultanpur, Ambedkarnagar, Allahabad, highest in the eastern region, followed by the western region. Fatehpur, Banda, Mahoba, Hardoi, Unnao, Khiri, Etah, F irozabad, This exercise intends to further disaggregate estimates at the 17 Hathras, Aligarh, Kannoj and Bijnor. The 19 districts between

Source: Calculated from 61st Round of NSS data

Gorakhpur, Allahabad, and Devipatan. Between on Consumption, 2004-05. poverty. Urban poverty in six districts was in

4 Imperatives

The above analysis shows that the state’s fluctuating growth rates could not keep pace with the national average. Agriculture and irrigation suffered neglect in plan expenditure amidst stagnating revenue, declining central transfers, and the intermittent change of governments. The index of development suggests that no d istricts in the eastern and Bundelkhand regions were in the most developed category. At the same time, many districts in the w estern and central regions were also on the lower rungs. A lmost all the districts in Bundelkhand and the eastern region were in a lower state of development and lagging behind those in the western and central regions. As a result, vertical disparities in terms of consumption deficiencies were reflected to a higher degree in these two regions. Although disparities among the districts in terms of distribution of per capita income were not that serious except in the Central region, the incidence of poverty was highest in the eastern region. Agricultural and casual l abourers, marginal and small farmers, and SCs and STs were the most poor across the regions. The real challenge is to address the intra-regional horizontal and vertical disparities at the district level which are hardly explicit in macro level data for the state as a whole.

Baran, P (1957): The Political Economy of Growth (New

Datt, G and M Ravallion (1993): “Regional Disparities, S econd Edition 1970, reprint 1983.

Pre- and Post-Reforms Decades”, Economic & Po

( Washington DC: World Bank). Development Challenges Afflicting Uttar Pradesh litical Weekly, Vol 39, No 10, 6 March.

– (1998) “Why Have Some Indian States Done (Manak Publications). Boudeville, J R (1966): Problems of Regional Economic B etter than Others at Reducing Rural Poverty?” Dreze J and A Sen (1995): India: Economic Develop-

Planning (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University E conomica, Vol 65, 17-38. ment and Social Opportunity (Oxford University Press).

Deaton, Angus and Jean Dreze (2009): “Food and Press). Das, Keshab and Ashwini K Mishra (2009): “Ensuring N utrition in India: Facts and Interpretations”, Frank, A G (1967): Capitalism and Underdevelopment

june 27, 2009 vol xliv nos 26 & 27

in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press).

Friedmann, J (1966): Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela (Cambridge: MIT Press).

– (1973): “A Theory of Polarised Development” in (ed.), J Friedmann, Urbanisation, Planning and National Development, 41-64 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage).

Government of UP (2007): “Eleventh Five-Year Plan.

Government of UP”, Regional Disparities and Backwardness, http://planning.up.nic.in/annualplan0506/part1/Chapter-07.htm, accessed on

25 July 2008. Hirschman, A O (1958): The Strategy of Economic D evelopment (New Haven: Yale University Press). Kaldor, N (1960): Essays on Value and Distribution; On Economic Stability and Growth; On Economic P olicy (London: Duckworth). Lipton, Michael (1982): “Why Poor People Stay Poor” in John Harriss (ed.), Rural Development, ELBS, London, 66-81. Myrdal, G (1957): Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London: Duckworth). Noorbakhsh, F (2003): “Human Development and

R egional Disparities”, India Centre for Development Studies, University of Glasgow, Discussion Paper No 2003-12. http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/ media_22245_en.pdf accessed on 25 July 2008.

Papola, T S (2005): “Emerging Structure of India Economy: Implications of Growing Inter-Sectoral Imbalances”, Presidential Address, 88th Annual Conference of Indian Economic Association.

Perroux, F (1950): “Economic Space: Theory and Applications”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64:89-104 cited in Chakravorty, S (2000): “How Does Structural Reform Affect Regional Development? Resolving Contradictory Theory with Evidence from India”, Economic Geography, Vol 76, No 4, October.

Ravallion, M and G Datt (2002): “Why has Economic Growth Been More Pro-poor in Some States in I ndia than Others?” Journal of Development Economics, 68, 381-400.

Rawal, V (2008): “Ownership Holdings of Land in Rural India: Putting the Record Straight”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 43, No 10, 8 March.

Raychoudhuri, R C and I Habib (1982): The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol I (Orient L ongmans).

Santos, M (1979): The Shared Space: The Two Circuits of the Urban Economy in Underdeveloped Countries

(London: Methuen).

Sharma, H R (1992): “Evolution of Agrarian Relati0ns in India”, Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, January-March.

– (1994): “Distribution of Landholdings in Rural I ndia, 1953-54 to 1981-82: Implications for Land Reforms”, Economic & Political Weekly, A-14 and A-17.

Timberlake, M (1987): “World-System Theory and the Study of Comparative Urbanisation” in M P Smith and J R Feagin (ed.), The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring and Community Politics, 37-65 (L ondon: Blackwell).

Tyagi, Y (2008): “Development and Deprivation in U ttar Pradesh”, paper presented in a National Seminar on UP Economy at the Cross Roads at Giri Institute of Development Studies, 25-27 March.

Williamson, J G (1965): “Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development”, Economic D evelopment and Cultural Change, 13: 3-45.

SPECIAL ISSUE
D D KOSAMBI: THE MAN AND HIS WORK
July 26, 2008
D D Kosambi: The Scholar and the Man	–Meera Kosambi
Early Indian History and the Legacy of D D Kosambi	–Romila Thapar
Towards a Political Philology: D D Kosambi and Sanskrit	–Sheldon Pollock
The Lily and the Mud: D D Kosambi on Religion	–Kunal Chakrabarti
Kosambi’s Archaeology	–Shereen Ratnagar
Kosambi and Questions of Caste	–Kumkum Roy
Kosambi, Marxism and Indian-History	–Irfan Habib
The Kosambi Effect: A Hermeneutic Turn That Shook Indian Historiography	–Rajan Gurukkal
D D Kosambi and the Study of Early Indian Coins	–B D Chattopadhyaya
Science Is the Cognition of Necessity	–Vivek Monteiro
For copies write to:
Circulation Manager,
Economic and Political Weekly,
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in

EPW

june 27, 2009 vol xliv nos 26 & 27