I Economic Value of Education

(ii) Education as a screening device, which identifies ability;

(iii) Education fosters the building up of social capital by inculcating socially acceptable norms of behaviour, and;

(iv) Education is valued for its intrinsic value, which is synonymous with viewing it as a consumption good.

The human capital approach views expenditure on education primarily as an investment, which earns a net positive rate of return for the investor (who happens to be a student in this context) in terms of a future stream of higher earnings than what would have been otherwise possible exceeding costs of education comprising explicit as well as implicit costs. This approach [Schultz 1961; Becker 1993] underlies much of the literature on theoretical and empirical evidence on convergence and endogenous growth theory. Based on this, it is argued that higher education should be primarily funded by the investor as the private rate of return exceeds the social rate of return narrowly defined1 [Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004]. However, there is a rationale for public support for higher education if the social rate of return is broadly defined with the inclusion of positive externalities which eventually exceeds private returns. In this approach, the rate of return is used for guiding the allocation of resources within the education sector as well as at the macro level.2

Endogenous growth models [Romer 1986; Lucas 1988] assume increasing returns to scale, which imply a positive rate of growth in the steady state. In such models, the factors behind growth are determined within the system, i e, endogenously as compared to Solow’s model, which assumes constant returns to scale and views growth as the result of exogenous technological progress, which is determined residually. Human capital features prominently in endogenous growth models primarily to overcome the diminishing marginal productivity of capital exhibited under the constant returns to scale production function a la Solow’s model of growth. Studies indicate that higher education has substantial potential for fostering technological development3 and it is crucial for building a knowledge society to gain a competitive edge in the world economy.

Education as a screening device acts as a signal to employers about the potential productivity of their prospective employees. It calls into question the efficacy of public support to education as private returns tend to be greater than social returns because of the decisions of less able individuals to pursue education generate negative spillovers for others by making them appear less productive.

The social returns or positive externalities arising out of higher education are often non-economic advantages, which accrue to society as a whole. The valuation of such externalities remain problematic as markets are found “missing” to value these externalities. Some of the benefits, as discussed in the literature, are instilling patriotic values, inhibiting anti-social behaviour and corruption, compliance with cultural norms, smooth functioning of the institutions and upholding the principles of democracy [Drèze and Sen 1996; McMahon 2004].4 Majumdar (2005) argues that learning enables an individual to envisage a higher goal through transition from one set of rankings to another set of rankings of priorities transcending a materialistic approach to human life. Drèze and Sen (1996) concur that education, and in particular, primary education, should be valued essentially for its intrinsic property effecting transformation in the manner in which we exercise our choices and enjoy our freedom. This view dispenses with the use of rate of returns as a guide for policymaking and it supports public subsidisation of education irrespective of our remorseless obsession with rate of return estimates.

Stiglitz (1998, 2003) has reaffirmed the importance of education in economic development and argued that the acquisition of knowledge as the most important determinant of growth.5 Stiglitz argues that the role of education has to be considered not only as an instrument of development but also as a broader objective [Stiglitz 1998]. However, for Stiglitz, the rationale behind govern ment intervention in provision of education is based on the notion of human capital and its relationship with growth [Fine and Rose 2001].

II Public, Mixed or Merit Good?

Based on the above analysis, it follows that the issue we need to address is how to identify higher education as a good (or service) before we deal with the question of the mode of financing higher education. The pricing of higher education and the associated question of the extent of subsidisation is based on our understanding of this very basic question. Is higher education a public, mixed, quasi-public or even a merit good? In order for higher education to qualify to be a pure public good, two important characteristics need to be satisfied – that of non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability. Higher education fails to satisfy both these criteria. Often eligibility requirements are needed to be complied with for admission to institutes of higher learning and credential certificates are given to successful candidates who pass the examination and comply with the norms of the institutions for being considered as successful candidates. Therefore, there is rivalry in admission and the exclusion principle is also applicable to higher education. Higher education or training for skill development is not exactly akin to a private service either, which can be bought and sold in the market. Paying for the service does not entitle the student to the degree. It has to be earned or acquired [Majumdar 1983].6

A merit good is defined as a good preferred by the community as a whole and it is meant for societal benefit without any reference to the individual choice [Musgrave and Musgrave 1989; Creedy 1995] and it is more a matter of paternalistic choice implying that the government knows better than the individuals what is good for them. However, the merit good as defined by Srivastava et al (1997) is a non-public good with positive externalities7. It is disconcerting to note that higher education was identified to be a non-merit good as it defies the entire body of empirical evidence and the endogenous growth theory that higher education generates substantial externalities and influences growth.

Higher education is argued to be a mixed or quasi-public good as it combines the features of a private and public good. It is demanded privately as benefits accrue to the students who pursue higher education in terms of higher future stream of earnings and at the same time, it shares the feature of a public good with positive externalities accruing to the society [Musgrave and Musgrave 1989] as discussed above. Higher education is demanded by individuals who are adult enough to be considered as decisionmaking agents. It is therefore appropriate to consider higher education as a mixed or quasi-public good, i e, essentially a private good with positive externalities.

Economic theory tells us that investment in higher education is likely to be suboptimal because of positive externalities, and market failure also on account of long gestation periods, risk and uncertainty and information asymmetry. Markets may be “missing” or they are afflicted with information asymmetry failing thereby to assign true values to higher education more often than not as education brings about transformation in human life. Olssen (1996) has discussed some of the inherent problems with market solutions for social sector activities like education. All these calls for public support for higher education as a market, in general, fail. While the world over, higher education is supported by the government, the issue therefore is one of, ascertaining the extent of subsidisation. The imperfect nature of the credit market for education loans is another reason for not being able to entirely impose the burden of financing higher education on the household sector [Lleras 2005].

Public support for higher education is possibly the most dignified way to achieve socio-economic equity as higher education promotes social mobility by making the acquisition of skills and training accessible to the economically challenged section of society. This is, however, contested because students from well-off sections also stand to gain possibly more than the poor ones.

In the dominant neoliberal ideology, higher education is viewed as essentially a private, individualised commodity, which is in sync with the World Bank approach as well [Jones 1997]. The Bank as a promoter of an integrated world economy outlines its approach as follows: (i) to recover the public cost of higher education and reallocating government expenditure towards primary level with higher social returns; (ii) to promote education loans through the development of a credit market with selective scholarships, especially in higher education; and (iii) to decentralise the management of public education and encourage the expansion of non-government and community supported schools.

The overall thrust is therefore, to recover the public cost of higher education through exploration of alternative sources of financing including development of a credit market for education and increased emphasis on better governance of institutions of higher learning. This is expected to release resources for the purpose of reallocation towards lower levels with higher social returns and at the same time explore alternative sources of financing higher education. To support their arguments, they emphasise the regressive nature of public support to higher education as benefits are argued to be appropriated mainly by the privileged section of society, inequitable participation patterns, unrealistic curriculum orientation and elitist functions (ibid).

George Psacharopoulos (1973) showed that the return to primary education is more than that of higher education, arguing in favour of reducing the extent of subsidisation as one climbs up the education ladder. But in a knowledge driven society, it is being realised that higher education is crucial for determining the competitive edge of an economy in the global market as it fosters innovation and development and dissemination of technology. In the process, it sets the stage for building up a knowledge society. In the evolution of the concept of human capital, over the decades, the stress was more on productivity gain in the first wave of human capital theory [Marginson 1997].

Moreover, counter-posing primary education with higher education is fallacious [Kumar 2004; Majumdar 1997]. Higher education provides inputs to primary and secondary education in terms of teachers and administrators. On the other hand, with the fall in the drop-out rate and increase in the enrolment ratio, the entry to higher education is expected to increase. Further, one should not ignore the adverse implications that funding of higher education would have on employment prospects in the education sector [Khadria 2004]. Therefore, investment in different stages of education is sequential in nature and need not be viewed in isolation. Using the rate of return to determine investment decisions in education has been extensively critiqued by Majumdar (1983) from a social choice perspective. Further, the theory of human capital ignores any understanding of the educational processes and historical and social specificity of a country. The methodology, which is applied to assess the future stream of costs and benefits of education could also be applied to any other factor with economic effects, thereby denying the specific characteristics education as a whole is associated with [Fine and Rose 2001].

Potential for market failure is as much in primary education as in higher education. In the former, even parents who emerge as decision-makers for these school-going students are not always in a position to fully comprehend the benefits of education. However, investments in education continue to be risky [Lleras 2005; Hillman 2003] from the perspective of an individual on account of the following factors.

III Public Support for Higher Education: Evidence

Though, theoretically there is a strong case for public support to higher education and this is indeed corroborated by statistics from the developed world,9 the issue of the extent of subsidisation has become debatable as it is an important policy question in view of a policy trade-off between enhancing enrolment and ensuring equity and equal access in the context of fiscal constraints. Some of the options that are being explored the world over are deregulation of fees, education vouchers, education loans, income contingent loans (ICL), graduate tax, and own resource generation [Greenaway and Haynes 2004; Tilak 2004].

In the past, there have been attempts by the government to usher in changes in the higher education system towards a system where the government’s role is substantially curbed and space is created for the private sector to occupy and operate. The National Democratic Alliance government tried to revive the Private Universities (Establishment and Regulation) Bill, which was introduced in the Rajya Sabha in August 1995. The bill made it clear that private universities will be self-financing without being dependent on the government for financial support. To facilitate this, the universities will be offering courses in emerging areas of science and technology. The bill is still pending in the Parliament because some of the clauses attached to it [Sharma 2005] such as a permanent endowment of Rs 10 crore, 30 per cent full freeships and government control and monitoring may have made it unpalatable for the private sector. The University Grants Commission (UGC) issued a concept paper in October 2003 declaring one of its major objectives be to the mobilisation of financial resources to become self-sufficient. The paper also advocated nurturing commercial and corporate culture for better and efficient governance of universities.

The share of the public sector in education is predominant the world over. Among the industrialised countries that comprise the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the average share of public funding in primary, secondary, and post-secondary non-tertiary education was around 90 per cent in 1998. For developing countries, the share is lower but substantial [Gradstein et al 2005]. In terms of GDP, OCED countries spend around 6 per cent and 13 per cent of government expenditure. The share of public funding in total tertiary sector education expenditure is around 79 per cent for OECD countries. However, the share of private sector spending is rising. Despite this, for certain countries, the share of public funding did not decline. In a number of OECD countries, private spending soared by more than 30 per cent between 1995 and 1999.

IV Exploring Options for Financing Higher Education

The idea is to deregulate the fee structure so that it tends to reflect the per capita cost of education to the extent possible as students move up the ladder of education. The basic fee structure has remained virtually stagnant in Indian universities over the last several decades. The Punnaya Committee (1993) suggested increasing fees so as to partly recover the cost of education.11 The National Knowledge Commission suggested an upward revision in the fee structure so as to recover 20 per cent of the expenditure of universities. A draft legislation entitled ‘The Private Professional Educational Institutions – Regulation and Fixation of Fee Act 2005’ is under consideration by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. It states that the determination of the fees would be based on location of the institute, nature of the course and cost of land and the building. A provision of a reasonable surplus has also been accommodated.12 Proper accounting procedures should be followed like valuation of revenues forgone due to waiver of fees to the students of socially and economically backward sections, expenditure on administration and maintenance. There has been an attempt to link fee structure to the cost of education albeit to a limited extent in the recent past. In a small sample of 39 universities, Tilak (2004) argues that more than half a dozen universities raised fees in such a way that they could recover more than 50 per cent of theit recurring income and another 13 universities could generate more than 20 per cent. In many developed countries, revenues from fees would constitute merely 15-20 per cent of the costs of higher education [Tilak 2004]. But broadly speaking, this attempt has remained largely unsuccessful for majority of the universities. The student protest has deterred the government from doing so. It is also argued that the universities are reluctant to raise resources as the present system of providing grants-in-aid deduct the extent of own resource generation [Government of India 2007].

However, there is an emerging trend of practising differential fee structures for different courses as new market-oriented courses are being offered at higher fees to overcome financial crunches and to become financially viable in the long run. This tends to aggravate inequity in the society as only students from the privileged section of society can afford these courses, which presumably promise higher stream of future income for students. To safeguard equal access to higher education and the role it plays in equalising opportunities for students coming from different strata of society, there is indeed a need for more scholarships and financial aid to students. There was a proposal mooted by the ex-vice chancellor of Delhi University that the last fee paid by students in the previous class should be treated as a benchmark for determining the college and university fee to be paid. While this resolves the problem of finding out the affordability of the student, albeit partially,13 the problem with this approach is that it distorts the choice of the parents at the school level as government schools charge lower fees than privately funded schools. Overcoming this problem entails mitigating differential quality at the school level between government and private schools. There is, in fact, a scope for raising fees only to a limited extent as even a semblance of cost recovery will lead to an astronomical jump in the fee structure.14

Allowance for making a reasonable surplus would mean that colleges and universities may function more like profit maximising entities. This may have serious implications for quality. As Majumdar (1983) explains, the concept of input, output and an input-output relationship are fuzzy for academic institutions. Inputs are students who themselves are, in fact, decision-makers.15 Valuation of output is a tricky business with teaching and research being carried out together. How does one assign market values to the number of students passing out of the institutions? In fact, there is no input-output relationship, which can be subject to an optimisation exercise. It can be argued that cutting costs or maximisation of output may involve compromise with quality and equity unless adequate safeguard measures are adopted.

The fee structure at the Indian Institute of Technology (IITs) and Indian Institute of Management (IIMs) is at a much higher level, which is closer to the cost of provision, relatively speaking. There is little protest over it as these courses are job-oriented. The safeguard that exists for students coming from the underprivileged sections of society is not an issue because, one, there are few takers from that section of the society; and two, these courses are job-oriented and, therefore, even commercial banks come forward to provide loans to needy students.

market development and all the disadvantages of education loans are equally valid for this scheme. The countries where this scheme has been successful are very different from our system.

Income contingent loans (ICLs) have turned out to be successful in some developed countries [Greenaway and Haynes 2004] since job market uncertainty, the major deterrent for opting for loans is substantially reduced as loans are required to be paid only if income exceeds a certain threshold limit. However, this requires a proactive role to be played by the government instead of commercial banks. The other advantage is that this scheme does not require any upfront payment. Designing ICLs poses several tricky issues such as (i) the income level on which contingent payments would be based and percentage to be paid out of it; (ii) the period over which repayment is to be made; (iii) interest rate; and (iv) collection method and “buyout” features. Barr and Crawford (1998) have discussed how this could be implemented without hurting access and avoiding revenue leakages.

Graduate tax is a tax in addition to the general income tax, which is imposed on graduates. Like any other tax it needs to be paid only if income exceeds a certain threshold limit. It achieves the same objective of delinking loans with job prospect. However, it has many demerits. It distorts the tax structure and may add to the costs of tax administration and tax compliance mitigating the benefits of tax reforms. This scheme is not flexible and does not encourage competition. The payment to be made by the student remains independent of costs of education [Greenaway and Haynes 2004]. Creedy (1995) shows in a model, which recognises the budget constraint of the government, an unconditional grant to all may entail a rise in the tax rate in future. Grants are argued to be just like deferred fees. This however may not be tenable if we dispense with the notion of honouring the budget constraint of the government in an inter-temporal framework. As GDP grows, the budget allocation can also grow, even in real terms. It is, after all, a question of prioritisation. In case graduates obtained their degrees from privately-aided institutions with little or no financial support from the government, justification of imposing such a tax would be weaker on these graduates.

The objective of popularising education vouchers by giving entitlements directly to students instead of to institutions is argued to foster competition among institutions to achieve efficiency (or X-efficiency) as students exercise a greater freedom of choice [Glennerster 1991]. The value of the entitlements may be allowed to vary with respect to the cost of the course, socioeconomic background, and encourage participation in particular courses. This is expected to encourage competition not only within publicly-funded education but between public and privately-funded education as well. This scheme ensures targeting and transparency. Students are allowed to top up their entitlements if needed and this is the only way to generate more revenues out of this system [Greenaway and Haynes 2004]. In the presence of quality differences between government-funded and private-funded institutions, the one with inferior quality will gradually be eliminated from the market. This is generally tried for school level education and may not work well for higher education as costs of higher education are generally much higher than that of school education. Also, there are possibilities of leakages and administration costs.

It has already been noted that there has been an explicit attempt to encourage colleges and universities to offer courses, which are largely self-financing, opening thereby the possibility of crosssubsidisation. This can be implemented if the courses are in high demand in the market. For example, Guru Govind Singh Indraprashtha University offer courses, which are in demand and the university can give affiliations to self-financing private colleges. This generates more resources for universities but at the same time, stepmotherly treatment of other disciplines may undermine academic ambience.

Own resource generation through commercial funding of research projects by universities may lead to the domination of the market over research agenda. However, this can be overcome through government funding of basic research facilities.

It is argued that running colleges and universities should ensure efficient functioning, similar to that of a firm trying to maximise profit. It is argued that the costs can be decreased substantially if the salary structure of the teachers is delinked from that of civil service employees. Class size may be increased wherever possible with increasing the number of shifts of the staff. It is maintained that these steps would release resources for primary education. As discussed above, the application of the efficiency principle may ultimately be achieved at the expense of quality and equity, sooner or later. What is, however, undeniable is to improve governance, better utilisation of funds, democratic decision-making and ensuring compliance with the norms through participation of the stakeholders like students. Only this would ensure the delivery of quality services and best utilisation of existing facilities. Therefore, a change in management and leadership can bring about major improvements. This is important keeping in mind that education is, after all, a service with a difference. Private colleges with the objective of generating reasonable surplus, hire teachers on a contract basis with substantially lower salaries. As a result, quality suffers.

One major focus of fiscal reform is now on governance. The institutions of higher education in the public sector are afflicted with problems similar to that of the government. To ensure better delivery of services, the time has come to think of reforming the management of public sector institutions. The institutions, which can compete with the rest of the world also happen to be in the government sector. The issue is how to replicate this creation of excellence in other institutions as well.

The imposition of an additional cess in the budget would ensure a substantial increase in the allocation for secondary and higher education. Asking the taxpayers to foot the bill to a large extent may be a good idea keeping in mind that the government has to continue its support for primary education and compliance with the FRBM Act. However, it can be argued that tinkering with the tax rate is not a good idea as it raises the distortionary effect of a higher tax rate. Imposing a cess is what the government can possibly think of under the compelling circumstances. The majority of the universities are funded, to a large extent, by the states and the resource crunch at the state level would hinder the overall increase in the budget for higher education.

13 Parental income may come down as students climb up the ladder of higher education.

14 The norm is to recover to the tune of 20 per cent of expenditure.

15 The cost of choosing the right combination of inputs for profit maximisation does not arise strictly speaking.

16 The need for collateral may be dispensed with [Government of India 2007]. The CABE report has suggested setting up a Higher Education Finance Corporation, pooling resources from the corporate sector and the government to coordinate loan schemes being operated by banks.

17 The human capital option is a variant of the HCC in which “the underlying asset is the value of the earnings that an individual receives as a result of his productive efforts during a given period of time” [Lleras 2005]. The owner has a right to buy or sell a asset.

18 Recently, Tapas Majumdar Committee has also referred to this.

Barr, N and I Crawford (1998): ‘Funding Higher Education in an Age of Expansion’, Education Economics, Vol 6, No 1, pp 45-70.

Becker, G S (1993): Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, originally published in 1964.

Central Advisory Board of Education (2005): ‘Financing of Higher and Technical Education’, report of the CABE Committee, National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, June, New Delhi.

Carnoy, Martin (1995): ‘Structural Adjustment and the Changing Face of Education’, International Labour Review, Vol 134, No 6, pp 653-73.

Creedy, John (1995): The Economics of Higher Education: An Analysis of Taxes versus Fees, Edward Elgar, Aldershot.

Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen (1996): India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Oxford University Press, Delhi.

Fine, Ben and Pauline Rose (2001): ‘Education and the Post-Washington Consensus’ in Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus (eds), Development Policy in the Twenty-first Century, London, Routledge.

Friedman, Milton (1962): Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Government of India (2007): ‘Report to the Nation 2006, National Knowledge Commission’, January, New Delhi.

Glennerster, Howard (1991): ‘Quasi-markets for Education?’, Economic Journal, Vol 101, No 408, September, pp 1268-76.

Gradstein, Mark, Moshe Justman and Volker Meier (2005): The Political Economy of Education, The MIT Press, England.

Greenaway, David and Michelle Haynes (2004): ‘Funding Higher Education’ in G Johnes and J Johnes (eds), International Handbook on the Economics of Higher Education, Edward Elgar.

Hillman, Arye L (2003): Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government, Cambridge University Press, UK.

Jones, Phillip W (1997): ‘On World Bank Education Financing’, Comparative Education, Vol 33, No 1, pp 117-29.

Khadria, Binod (2004): ‘The Subsidies Question in Higher Education’ in J B G Tilak (ed), Education, Society and Development, APH Publishing Corporation for National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi.

Kumar, Arun (1999): The Black Economy in India, Penguin Books, New Delhi.

– (ed) (2004): Challenges Facing Indian Universities, Jawaharlal Nehru University Teachers’ Association (JNUTA), New Delhi.

Kumar, Arun, Saumen Chattopadhyay and A Sunil Dharan (2005): ‘Fiscal Policy’, Alternative Economic Survey, India 2004-05, Disequalising Growth, Daanish Books, Delhi.

Lleras, M Palacios (2005): Investing in Human Capital: A Capital Markets Approach to Student Learning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lucas, Robert, E Jr (1988): ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’, Journal of Monetary Economics, July, Vol 22, No 1, pp 3-42. Majumdar, Tapas (1983): Investments in Education and Social Choice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

– (1997): ‘Economics of Indian Education for the Next Century’, The Indian Economic Journal, Vol 45, No 4.

Marginson, Simon (1997): ‘Subjects and Subjugation: The Economics of Education as Power Knowledge’, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, Vol 18, No 2, pp 215-27. Reprinted in P Marshall and M Peters (eds), Education Policy, An Elgar Reference Collection, Edward Elgar Publishing, UK.

McMohan, Walter W (2004): ‘The Social and External Benefits of Education’ in G Johnes and J Johnes (eds), International Handbook on the Economics of Education, Edward Elgar.

Musgrave, R and P Musgrave (1989): Public Finance in Theory and Practice, Fifth Edition, McGraw Hill International Editions.

Olssen, Mark (1996): ‘In Defence of the Welfare State and Publicly Provided Education: A New Zealand Perspective’, Journal of Education Policy, Vol 11, No 3, pp 337-62.

Patnaik, Prabhat (2005): ‘Education and Globalisation’, Social Scientist, Vol 33, Nos 9-10, pp 101-11.

Psacharopoulos, G (1973): Returns to Education, American Elsevier, New York.

Psacharopoulos, G and H A Patrinos (2004): ‘Human Capital and Rates of Return’ in G Johnes and J Johnes (eds), International Handbook on the Economics of Education, Edward-Elgar.

Punnayya, K (Chairman) (1993): Report of Justice Punnayya Committee of UGC Funding of Institutions of Higher Education, University Grants Commission, New Delhi.

Romer, Paul M (1986): ‘Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth’, Journal of Political Economy, October, Vol 94, No 5, pp 1002-37.

Schultz, T W (1961): ‘Investment in Human Capital’, American Economic Review, Vol 51, pp 1-17.

Sharma, Vijender (2005): ‘Commercialisation of Higher Education in India’, Social Scientist, Vol 33, Nos 9-10, September-October, pp 64-74.

Srivastava, D K, T K Sen, H Mukhopadhyay, C Bhujanga Rao and H K Amar Nath (1997): Government Subsidies in India, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.

Srivastava, D K and C Bhujanga Rao (2004): ‘Government Subsidies in India: Issues and Approach’ in E Favaro and A Lahiri (eds), Fiscal Policies and Sustainable Growth in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Srivastava, Ravi (2007): ‘Meeting Social Goals or Neoliberal Reform?’, Economic and Political Weekly, March 10, pp 812-15.

Stiglitz, J E (1998): ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward a Post-Washington Consensus’, the 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, WIDER, Helsinki.

– (2003): ‘Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics’ in Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, Ravi Kanbur and Barry Nalebuff (eds), Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E Stiglitz, The MIT Press, Cambridge.

Tilak, Jandhyala B G (2004): ‘Public Subsidies in Education in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, January 24, pp 343-59.