ANAND SWAROOP VERMA, GAUTAM NAVLAKHA

I

Degenerate Parliamentary Politics

It is worth recalling that the armed struggle of the Nepalese people against feudal monarchy is as old as the kingdom itself. Thus struggle persisted even after the 1950 overthrow of Rana autocracy, which had wielded state power until then. The 1950 Indian intervention, which restored the king’s power, was soon followed by several anti-feudal struggles in 1952-53, primarily in western Nepal. In these struggles, government officials were removed, feudal landlords were eliminated and foodgrains looted and redistributed. Failing to subdue this rebellion, the king sought the help of Indian troops. In 1959 when the Nepali Congress, then led by B P Koirala, signed Gandak agreement with India it triggered off violent protests against it. The Nepali Congress which was thrown out by the king on December 16, 1960, then initiated in 1962 and again in 1971 an armed uprising. In 1972-73, inspired by Naxalbari, an armed struggle broke out in Jhapa. The introduction of the multiparty system in 1991, as a sequel to the protracted struggle against partyless Panchayat regime, spurred the people’s aspirations at various levels.

In these 30 years, 1960-1990, the democratic forces went through lot of trials and tribulations. Since the Nepali Congress had at one time held the reins of power and had developed cordial foreign relations, particularly with the ruling classes of India, it did not bear the brunt of repression. Despite the fact that it took to arms in 1962 and 1971, its movement against the monarchical system remained qualitatively different from that launched by the left forces. Many communist formations were active during this time, the most powerful among them being the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) (CPN(ML)). The party, inspired by the Naxalbari movement in India, had carried out a peasant led anti-feudal movement in Jhapa in eastern Nepal.

Without going into the strategy and tactics adopted by the Jhapa peasant movement,

Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007 it can certainly be said that the movement laid the traditions of communist struggle and sacrifice. Several activists of the CPN(ML) were killed, many more were put behind the bars, while the land and the properties of many others were attached by the state. In spite of repression, many young people left their home and hearth and dedicated their lives to the establishment of a genuinely democratic order. The CPN(ML), in its First National Convention (held between December 26, 1978 and January 1, 1979) had resolved that “(t)he party…shall unite and lead through a protracted peoples’ struggle all such progressive forces who are committed towards the victory of the ‘New Democratic Revolution’ in Nepal as a prerequisite for the eventual establishment of a socialist and communist society.”1 The resolution identified the agrarian revolution as the kernel of the new democratic revolution and committed itself to uproot “the power of big landlords through armed struggle”.2 After the declaration of a multiparty system, the CPN(ML) which had so far been functioning underground started working as an open political party. They tried to unite other left formations and were successful to a considerable extent. The party in association with Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist), led by Manmohan Adhikari, formed the Unified Marxist-Leninist Party, which was christened CPN(UML).

The CPN(UML) participated in the first democratic elections held on May 12, 1991 after the establishment of the multiparty system. Although the party was a newcomer in the electoral arena, it scored major victories in various places as compared to the Nepali Congress, well steeped in the rituals of parliamentary democracy. In this election, the Nepali Congress won 110 seats, whereas CPN(UML) captured 69 seats. Undoubtedly, against all odds, it was a great achievement for the CPN(UML). In subsequent elections, the party forged ahead of the Nepali Congress and, for the first time in south Asia, a communist government took over the reins of power at the national level. Yet, once the party entered the realm of parliamentary politics, it jettisoned its historical legacy to bring about social transformation, beginning with radical land reforms. Instead, in order to remain in power it took recourse to the same means adopted by the Nepali Congress.

Thus if the Nepali Congress took the support of the pro-monarchy Rashtriya Prajatantrik Party (RPP), then the same means were adopted by the CPN(UML).

The RPP was then led by Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Surya Bahadur Thapa who had earlier been prime ministers in the panchayat system. In fact, Lokendra Bahadur Chand was the prime minister at a time when a massive and unprecedented protest movement was taking place outside the Royal Palace in 1990. In September 1995, the Nepali Congress government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba had secured the support of RPP. In March 1997, CPN(UML) helped install RPP’s Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the PM in spite of the fact that the CPN(UML) had 90 members of Parliament (MPs), whereas RPP could boast of only 10. This was done to prevent Nepali Congress from forming the government.

Again in October 1997, the Nepali Congress helped in installing the RPP’s Surya Bahadur Thapa as PM. At that time, the RPP had only 17 MPs, whereas Nepali Congress could boast of a strength of 85 MPs. The Nepali Congress resorted to this ploy to prevent the communists from forming the government. In March 1998, there was a split in the CPN (UML) and 40 MPs walked out of the party to form CPN(ML). The same story was repeated when the new party also indulged in playing the same power brokering games as its predecessor. In August 1998, the new party, in collaboration with the Nepali Congress formed the government. In this descent towards degeneration, CPN(UML) could not be expected to be an exception. In December 1998, the coalition government of the Nepali Congress and the splinter group CPN(ML) collapsed. Immediately afterwards, as on cue, the CPN(UML) formed the government in alliance with the Nepali Congress.

It would not be far-fetched to say that to remain in power at any cost, the political parties betrayed the trust of the people.3 It is against this background and resultant disenchantment of people with parliamentary brokering, in particular with the tactics of the parliamentary communist parties, that one can locate PW. First the 1990 transfer of power from the palace to the political parties gave wind to people’s expectations. Whereas in the Terai region, the people’s expectations were for ending feudal landlordism which was rampant, in the far-flung areas in the east as well as west, the popular demand was to end the neglect of these regions. On both counts, the political parties failed. Moreover, the shenanigans of the communists hastened the process of disenchantment. Also, while the international situation was unfavourable for the launch of social transformatory projects, conditions nationally were just the opposite. Nepal’s economy was in a crisis by 1994-95. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stipulates that any country whose foreign debt is 200-250 per cent of the value of exports and debtservicing ratio is 20 per cent of the same is in a “critical stage”. Nepal’s foreign debt jumped to 600 per cent of the total export trade and debt servicing to exports reached 35 per cent. Profligacy and scarcity, typical of a nascent capitalist country with strong feudal roots, not only contributed to low capital formation but also made it dependent on foreign donors for up to 70 per cent of its revenue needs. The migration of people in search of jobs had picked up in the 1970s and began to surge towards the end of the 1980s. The economic embargo imposed by India in 1989 brought home rather painfully the dependent nature of the relationship with India.

In initiating the PW, the Maoists were not simply engaging in combat; the very act of fighting was political. Acquisition of weapons by looting the armouries to arm themselves was as much a mark of their independence as of their awareness that any challenge to undermine the status quo would invite military suppression. It was increasingly realised that radical land reform, women’s liberation, the right of self-determination of nationalities and social justice could not be brought about through parliament under the 1990 constitution. Even the actual conduct of the Maoists was pregnant with revolutionary tactics. Their secret parleys with Birendra (king of Nepal from 1972 until 2001), playing on his patriotism and Sihanouk like role, achieved its aim, even as they were able to maintain a line of communication with the political parties. Thereby the Maoists delayed the deployment of the army against them until they were prepared. They won this time by exploiting the contradictions between the palace and the political parties on the one hand, especially over the control exercised by the king over the army, and between the various political parties on the other. When the PW began on February 13, 1996, it was dismissed as being of no major consequence. And, as in the past, a “police action” was felt to be capable of quelling this problem.4 However, by 2000 India and the US began pressurising the Nepal government to bring in the army. It was

Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007

the attack on Dunai which was the headquarters of Dolpa district, on September 24, 2000, which brought home what it meant to keep the army out of the fighting. The army unit, based in the district headquarter watched while the Maoists destroyed the police station; it did not intervene. It was after this incident that the tussle between the king and the political parties for control and deployment of the army began in earnest. Although king Birendra gave in to international and national pressure by the end of April 2001 and agreed to an Integrated Security and Development Programme which was meant to bring in the army to the frontline in the fight against the Maoists. Nevertheless, following the assassination of king Birendra and his family on June 1, 2001, the situation changed dramatically.

Advantage of Hindsight

With the advantage of hindsight, it is worth a pause to consider how the Maoists expanded and consolidated their position during the PW. The People’s War did not emerge in a vacuum or out of simply exploiting opportunities that came the way of the Maoists. It emerged after long years of political work amongst the people, debating the failings of earlier struggles, including Jhapa. There was intense debate and differences over tactics and strategy amongst their top leadership as well as the rank and file, and above all, about creating the opportunities. The most endearing quality of the Maoists has been their willingness to learn from every crisis, of which they were witness to several. A crisis was turned into an opportunity. It is this which enabled them to overcome the near split in the party in 2004-05 and bounce back strongly so as to be able to reach an agreement with the seven political parties by November 2005. In the process the question of “democracy” within the party got a boost. But, in 1995-96, the world was different. On December 13, 1995 in an interview given to The Independent, Baburam Bhattarai, a senior leader of the CPN(M) said that “every revolution appears as a dream before it is made...(and) appears like a nightmare for the reactionary classes before and after it is made”. And certainly, two months before the PW actually commenced this did appear to be a foolhardy enterprise. But commitment, perseverance and critical reflection pay. The Maoists leaders and leading cadres had been working underground long before the PW began. Some such as Kiran and Gaurav, from the 1960s, although most of the others began their journey from 1970 onwards. Prachanda and most of his other comrades began their political life in 1970s. When the first elections took place after the jan andolan of 1990 on May 12, 1991, the Samyukta Jan Morcha (United Peoples Front), headed by Baburam Bhattarai, won nine seats. The UPF was the open front of the communist group called Ekta Kendra (Unity Centre), which believed in armed struggle and was working underground. Though their seats were fewer than the seats won by the Nepali Congress or CPN(UML), the UPF secured the third position. Even as the UPF was taking part in the elections, the leaders of Ekta Kendra publicly campaigned that the Nepali people will not benefit from this parliament.

Meanwhile in December 1991, the Communist Party of Nepal (Ekta Kendra) which was reconstituted in 1986, changed its name to Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and after long deliberations and discussions, and some parting of ways, evolved the present line. Within this ideological context, the party came to the conclusion that PW is the only path for the successful completion of the New Democratic Revolution which would entail the encirclement of the cities from it villages, and, in this process, guerrilla warfare would play a strategic role. Following this the party carried out a large-scale survey in 1992 covering 18 districts. The objective of the survey was to identify the ways and means for initiating and carrying out PW. Several districts such as Rolpa, Rukum, Gorkha, Sindhuli, Dhanusha and Kavrepalanchowk were chosen for carrying out the preparatory work. In January 1994, when the CPN(UML) was in power, the Maoists had submitted a 38-point charter of demands concerning “nationalism, people’s democracy and people’s livelihood”.

Thus between 1990 and 1994, through public meetings, posters and pamphlets, the UPF leaders had been emphasising that the parliamentary system serves those who have been exploiting and tyrannising the common people. In 1994, mid-term elections took place in Nepal and the UPF boycotted it. The boycott of elections by them and the movement launched by Maoists against the local landlords and moneylenders was seen by the government as discarding parliamentary politics. As a result, large-scale repression was unleashed on the supporters of UPF and the Front had no other option but to go underground.

On February 4, 1996 the CPN(Maoist) submitted, through UPF a 40-point charter of demands to the then government headed by Sher Bahadur Deuba, giving that government a two-week ultimatum. But, a few days before the ultimatum was to expire, on February 13, they declared protracted People’s War against the state. The charter of demands were no different than what UPF had been demanding since April 1992, related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood issues. Thus, the first demand under “Concerning Nationality” was for abrogating “(a)ll discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty”. Under “Concerning People’s Democracy” the first demand was for drafting a new “constitution…by representatives elected for the establishment of a people’s democracy”. And finally, the first item under “Concerning Livelihood” demanded that “(l)and should belong to ‘tenants’. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless.” Besides, the 40-point demand focused on women and dalits as the two most discriminated groups, even amongst the exploited classes/ strata. And, they did so by mobilising them in the first instance. In other words, the 40-point demands were not a mere rhetorical device but were meant to be taken seriously, since these demands encapsulated their politics. That the charter of demands was dismissed in the first instance by the political parties had much to do with their bloated self-image, borne of being “mainstream” parties, either in power or as contenders for acquiring power.

In an atmosphere of repression and resistance, the Central Committee of the Party held its Fourth Extended Meeting in mid-1998. A “New Plan for New Stage” was chalked out in the meeting. Based on the experience of the past two and a half years, the party drew some important conclusions regarding this particular issue. At the ideological level, the party made an attempt to develop a clear perspective regarding the distinction between a guerrilla zone and a base area. According to the party, in a protracted PW, without a base area, there cannot be any surrounding of the cities by the countryside. Thus, whereas PW had established itself as a parallel power centre via-a-vis the state, the party’s assessment was that it was quite weak in terms of military strength. Therefore, augmentation of people’s military might was identified as the main task. Based on its own experience, the Party

Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007 underscored the point that if people do not possess military strength then it would not be possible to protect and uphold their achievements. Besides, due to lack of military might, people tend to lose their initiative. Thus the speedy formation of the new state necessitated the augmentation of military strength.5

In order to augment their military capabilities, many qualitative changes were carried out in the third year of PW. And bigger armed actions had been initiated by the party. But the interesting thing to note is that simultaneously while the war was being waged between 1998 and 2003, the ongoing process of formation of the new state was sought to be based on democratic principles. And the party was engaged in discussing the strategic importance of democracy for the new Nepal in the making, as well as the question of dissent, discipline and centralisation during the war within the party. People’s rule was organised at the village, region and base area levels; the principle of democratic centralism was followed. In areas where people’s local governments were in operation, the entire population were brought under the fold of various organisations and the right to recall their elected representatives encouraged. Above all, the new political setup was expected to harness human resources for economic resuscitation while fulfilling essential economic, social and cultural needs of the people. In 10 years what the Maoists achieved appears modest, but looked at from where they began, it is a novel people-oriented development, a story yet to be written.

Within three months of king Birendra’s assassination, negotiations took place in August 2001 between the government and the Maoists. Arguably, both sides needed a breathing space and used the period to consolidate themselves. However, the difference lay in their stated position at the negotiations. The Maoists stuck to their stance in terms of their demand for a round-table conference, an interim government and formation of an elected constituent assembly (CA), whereas the government appeared to have no clear idea other than wanting the Maoists to capitulate. And, once the September 11, 2001 attack took place in the US and the “war on terror” began, the prospects of talks dimmed perceptibly. When the talks broke down in November 2001, a few days later, the Maoists overran a big army garrison in western Nepal. The message sent out was clear while they favoured a democratic closure of the civil war, they were prepared to engage in war. By 2002, the tussle between king Gyanendra and the political parties had reached a new crisis point with the king declaring a state of emergency, dissolving local government bodies and dismissing the Deuba government because it had failed to hold general elections. The demand for an elected CA, however, was gaining supporters, with elements within the political parties discovering that the CA was a means to undercut the monarchy. Thus the PW entered a new phase, in which debate over an elected CA was gaining adherents. This was carried on until January 29, 2003 when a ceasefire was reached once again, and negotiations were attempted

Notes

1 Political resolution of CPN(ML), party’sunderground publication, 1979, p 20.

2 Ibid, p 27.

3 The sixth Congress of the Communist Party ofNepal (UML) was held in January 1998 andit is apparent, if we look into the statementsof party general secretary Madhav Nepal,politburo member C P Mainali and others onthe eve of the Congress, that CPN(UML) wasgrappling with regression within the party.General secretary Madhav Nepal had said inan interview, “Bourgeois deviations are growingwithin the party. Corruption, misuse of officeand charm for a luxurious lifestyle is on therise. Petty bourgeois individualism and lust forpower are acquiring deeper roots and a verylarge number of opportunists and self-seekershave become active in the party...anarchism,indiscipline and lumpenism are ever on the rise.There is no importance of party decisions anddiscipline. If a decision is favourable or to one’sliking, it is implemented, and if it is not, thenthere is an increasing tendency to defy it – eithercollectively or in a group mentality”(Interviewof Madhav Nepal Mansir 2054, Mulyankan(Kathmandu), pp 5-7). A senior leader and ideologue of the party, C P Manali, was also of asimilar view, that various deviations regardingthe character of the party, its functional styleand disciplinary matters have surfaced. Heattributed it largely to the compulsions to contestelections. He said “the party has been, at manyplaces, reduced to a front of the communistsand communist sympathisers, giving rise to thedangers of the weakening of the party character”(op cit, pp 8-9).

4 Until 1999-2000, India’s ministry of homeaffairs (MHA) and the ministry of defence(MoD) in their annual reports, did not once referto the presence of Maoists in Nepal. Their mainconcern then was Pakistan’s support for “anti-India activities from Nepal” and “growth ofreligious fundamentalist organisations” alongthe Indo-Nepal border. It was in 2000-01 thatthe reports begin to refer to Maoists. MoDannual report of 2000-01 spoke of a“development of concern... increasing intensityand spread of Maoist violence within Nepal”.After that there was no turning back. WhenMHA wrote in its annual report of 2001-02 of“the decision of the MCC [Maoist CommunistCentre] and the CPIML-PW [Communist Partyof India (Marxists Leninist) (People’s War)] totie up with the CPN(M) to carve out a ‘CompactRevolutionary Zone’.” The MoD annual reportof the same year claimed that “India has alsooffered such assistance as is desired by Nepal”to address Maoist extremism.

5 Report of the general secretary, CPN(Maoist),The Worker, No 4, 1998. Also see‘Third Turbulant Year of People’s War: A GeneralReview’, article by CPN(Maoist) generalsecretary Prachanda, February 1999. Also see,‘Experiences of the People’s War and SomeImportant Questions’, Document of the FourthExtended Meeting, August, 1998.

6 Interview of Prachanda by A S Verma, July 29,2006. at www.insn.org

Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007