Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007

objective behind such formulation further aimed at portraying Ambedkar as anti-Muslim in order to unite the dalits and caste Hindus against the Muslims.

Hindutva claims that Ambedkar’s choice of Buddhism was essentially Hindu. Sandeep Pendse, however, argues that Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism was a complete rejection of Hindu religion, caste system and ideologies of purity and pollution; it did not leave any space for accommodation, or compromise. If such sharp contradictions existed between Hinduism and the dalits, then how could Hindutva get a foothold among the latter? Sandeep Pendse contextualises this in the backdrop of the fragmentation of dalit politics. In Maharashtra, where the seeds of dalit politics germinated and flowered, Ambedkar’s writ did not run over the entire community; the Congress always had a considerable dalit constituency. In the post-Ambedkar era, dalit politics had a setback when the RPI was split due to tactical differences and personal ambitions of the leadership. The Dalit Panthers, despite their radical ideology and militant organisation also followed a similar trajectory. Though emergence of the BSP in the Hindispeaking states was another milestone, less emphasis on ideology and over-dependence on charismatic-populist politics checkmated its expansion. While dalit NGOs remained obsessed with funding and international publicity, “autonomous” dalit intellectuals alienated themselves from the dalit masses. All these developments manifested a kind of political and ideological hollowness which made it easy for Hindutva to make inroads into the dalit universe.

Gopal Guru makes an insightful observation on Hindutva’s penetration into the dalit bastion. As Guru explains, the public sector not only provided material security to many dalits, but also gave them psychological confidence to resist upper caste domination; with its dismantling, employment is rapidly shrinking and the expanding private sector is unwilling to open its doors to them. Hence, they fall back upon Hindutva primarily for material gains. However, their material objective is very much intertwined with a cultural quest as well. When dalit youths take part in Hindu religious festivals it is not just for a little pocket money, but also for glamour, public visibility, and some kind of cultural satisfaction. The glamour of Hindutva’s culture industry with electronic and digital spectacle overshadows the philosophical, rational and moral rigour of Ambedkarism.

Hindutva’s cultural domination gets further reinforced as globalisation fails to provide any meaningful cultural alternative to the dalit youths, thereby compelling them to go for “subsidised satisfaction”. Hence, they fall prey to the promising cultural universe of Hindutva, which is more of a pragmatic choice rather than a substantive one. Hindutva conveniently transmutes the caste into the communal category where dalits become Hindus, forgetting their caste antagonism and adversarial identities.

On the question of dalit propensity towards Hindu communalism, particularly on their participation in the Gujarat riots, Guru makes a sharp critique on moral and philosophical grounds. Why should society expect secular commitment only from the dalits when no caste/class is immune from communal prejudices, he asks? However, he concedes that dalits have a moral responsibility to lead the fight against the majority communalism, albeit without justifying their secular credentials to anyone. Thus, Guru certainly does not shy away from the question of the Hindutvadalit nexus in the Gujarat riots, which he finds to be an outcome of globalisation and the lack of capital to create conditions for secularism. An organised dalit movement, with its radical and ideological content, always acted as a bulwark against Hindutva’s inroads into the dalit bastion. Maharashtrian dalits certainly could not be mobilised against the minorities because of Ambedkar’s ideological legacy, shared cultural practices (e g, beef eating) between them and the Muslims, and the primacy of the “social”. Moreover, as Guru observes, dalits discourse on dignity was equally relevant for the minorities as well. Even during the 2002 Gujarat genocide, as Guru claims, dalits took a firm pro-Muslim stand. Here he is bit carried away; the pro-Muslim stand by the dalits was perhaps too feeble.

Ram Puniyani, a strong critic of Sangh parivar’s communal politics, discusses Hindutva’s hidden agenda behind its socalled social engineering programme. Hindutva, he observes, is the new edition of Manusmriti, which aims to perpetuate the dominance of elite upper class/caste Hindus over the dalits. Citing the examples of the Hindutva supported anti-dalit riots in Gujarat in 1980 and 1984, Puniyani argues that the dalits have always remained Hindutva’s prime targets. However, since the 1980s, the Sangh parivar cleverly changed its strategy by replacing the dalits with the Muslims as its prime target and adopting social engineering to woo the former. Though dalits had always been its victims, Hindutva successfully used them against Muslims during the Gujarat riots. Puniyani argues that Indian Muslims, who were mostly former untouchables, have again become new untouchables due to Hindutva politics, ironically with the support of the dalits. Meena Kandaswamy observes that Hindutva not only favours caste hierarchy but also promotes patriarchy which would have a dangerous impact on dalit women. She fears that this would domesticate dalit women and rob them of the very liberty and equality they possess.

Across the States

The second section, on the basis of studies on many states, focuses on Hindutva’s operation among the dalits and examines how they are drawn to Hindu communal politics. Two studies need specific mention: Suhas Palsikar on Maharashtra and Subhash Gatade on Uttar Pradesh. Both these states are unique in the sense that while both Hindutva and dalit politics had their strong ideological roots in Maharashtra, it was Uttar Pradesh which showed them the path to political power. Palsikar concludes that in Maharashtra due to the political and ideological weakness of dalit politics Hindutva has made inroads into the space once occupied by the progressive forces. He rightly suggests that the issue of dalit-Hindutva alliance needs to be examined beyond the realm of electoral politics; it involves larger questions of hegemony and fascism which threaten to obliterate democracy and justice. Dalit politics in Maharashtra might have failed to checkmate Hindutva, but unlike Uttar Pradesh it certainly did not become Hindutva’s partner. Gatade accuses the BSP for subverting the dalit agenda by making an alliance with Hindutva purely for the sake of political power. Analysing the three spells of cohabitation that Mayawati had with the BJP, Gatade argues that Mayawati, who was firm and confident to start with, finally gave in to the communal politics of the Sangh parivar. The worst happened when she gave a clean chit to Narendra Modi and even campaigned for him in the Gujarat elections. Ramesh Kamble mentions that reckless pursuit of political power ironically compelled her to ally with the very Hindu upper caste forces whose hegemony the BSP wanted to demolish.

The volume has four articles on Hindutva’s southern operation. Shivasundar

Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007 observes that despite Ambedkar’s strong influence on the dalits of Karnataka, the radical promise of the late 1970s ran out of steam. Absence of progressive dalit mobilisation in the state, depoliticisation and deradicalisation of dalit consciousness made the task of Hindutva fairly easy. Besides, the Sangh parivar has undertaken many pro-dalit projects; for example, its ‘sikhsha abhiyan’, funded by Infosys and Wipro, covers dalit children residing in 500 slums in Bangalore. The RSS distributes communal booklets free of cost to them in the name of education. The Sangh parivar organisations like the Bajrang Dal instigate the dalits to join anti-Muslim communal riots like the 2003 riots in Haveri, in which many Muslims lost their lives. Shivasundar finds that Hindutva’s influence among dalits is increasing in the areas facing acute economic crisis. K S Chalam traces the inroads of Hindutva into Andhra Pradesh to the onset of liberalisation and expansion of the service sector in urban areas after 1990. However, dalits in Andhra Pradesh, unlike other states, remained largely outside Hindutva as a majority of them have already got converted to Islam or Christianity. V Geetha attributes Hindutva’s growth in the state to the desecularisation of dravidian politics, Hindutva has consolidated its position among the dalits as dravidian politics gives preferential treatment to the backward castes vis-a-vis the dalits. T K Ramachandran and P T John discuss how Hindutvais making inroads into the tribal belt of Wyanad.

Navpreet Kaur, citing the example of the 2003 jat-dalit violent clash at Talhan makes an interesting observation in the context of Punjab; enhanced economic status of dalits does not guarantee them protection against oppression and discrimination. Anand Teltumbde and Subhash Gatade argue that unlike Maharashtra Gujarati dalits did not develop any dalit consciousness. Under Mahatma Gandhi’s “paternalistic” influence they perceived themselves as “harijans”– a part of Hindu community – and continued to submit to the hegemony of upper castes till 1980s which witnessed two severe anti-dalit riots. A nascent dalit consciousness was about to emerge; but Advani’s 1990 ‘rathyatra’ shattered that promise. Teltumbde and Gatade also examine Hindutva-dalit relationship in the context of economic crisis during the 1980s which severely deteriorated the living standard of dalits and Muslims. A sort of economic competition began between them and Hindutva conveniently converted it to communal clashes. Thus, the stage was set for their participation in the 2002 Gujarat riots.

This volume makes a bold attempt unfolding the contradictions and collaborations between dalits and Hindutva, from the vantage points of theory as well as practice. Though it is impossible to cover Hindutva-dalit interface in all the states in one volume, still there are some notable omissions like Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan, where Hindutva has carved out a dalit constituency. Secondly, analysis of certain states seems to be less rigorous and less nuanced. Thirdly, as some contributors construct dalit politics in the ideological prism of Marx and Ambedkar, they obviously become dismissive of the BSP, denying it the lead role in dalit politics. True, the BSP has compromised with Hindutva in the past and woos the brahminical forces at present; however, it has still not exhausted its secular potential which could be an asset in any struggle against Hindutva. On the whole, this work provides volumes of information and someexcellent analysis on the questions of caste and Hindu communal politics in India.

EPW

Email: pralaykanungo@yahoo.com

Economic and Political Weekly May 19, 2007