This paper is principally focused on the changes in the size and structure of the workforce and the changes in labour productivity, wages and poverty in India in the first quinquennium of the 21st century. The period between 2000 and 2005 saw a sharp acceleration in workforce growth, and, on the obverse side, a slowdown in the rate of growth of labour productivity across most sectors and in the economy as a whole, and, a slowdown (a decline) in real wage growth in rural (urban) India. Consistent with the trends in labour productivity and real wages, relative to the 1994-2000 period, the pace of poverty reduction between 2000 and 2005 shows, at best, a marginal acceleration (or a marginal deceleration, depending on the choice of poverty lines) in rural India and a clear slowdown in urban India. This period also saw a small rise in the number of working poor and a substantial rise in the number of self-employed and regular wage/salary workers in the "above poverty line" households.

Against the backdrop of the policy of reservation of seats in higher education for the Other Backward Classes in India, this paper examines two inter-related yet distinct issues: (i) the use of economic criteria for assessing the backwardness of different social groups, and (ii) assessment of fairness of access to higher education of an identified "backward" social group. On an analysis of the NSS 55th round surveys for 1999-2000 we show that, on a range of economic criteria, there is a clear hierarchy across (essentially) caste-based social groups, with the scheduled castes (in urban India) and the scheduled tribes (in rural India) at the bottom, the OBCs in the middle, and the non-SC/ST "Others" at the top. However, for the poor among them, there is more of a continuum across caste-groups, with surprisingly small differences between the OBCs and the non-SC/ST Others. It is also shown that for the OBCs as a group, and especially for over 70 per cent of them who are above the poverty line, the extent of their under-representation in enrolments at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels is less than 5 per cent. Therefore, a 27 per cent quota for the OBCs, which would effectively raise their share in enrolments to over 50 per cent when their share in the eligible population is 30 per cent or less, is totally unjustified.

This paper examines the levels and changes in poverty indicators of the rural and urban population in India disaggregated by social and economic groups. The analysis is based on the comparable estimates of poverty for the mixed reference period computed from the unit record data for the 50th (1993-94) and the 55th (1999-2000) rounds of the Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation. The issue is how far different social and economic groups shared the overall decline in poverty in the 1990s. The social groups most vulnerable to poverty have been identified to be scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households with both these groups having above average levels of poverty indicators in the rural and the urban population. Among the economic groups, the most vulnerable groups are the agricultural labour households (rural) and the casual labour households (urban) each having the highest levels of poverty indicators in their respective population segments. In terms of changes in poverty in the 1990s, it is found that while scheduled caste, agricultural labour (rural) and casual labour (urban) households experienced declines in poverty on par with the total population, scheduled tribe households fared badly in both the segments.

The authors examine the poverty situation in 15 major states across four distinct dimensions of headcount ratio, size of the poor population, depth and severity for the rural, the urban and the total population. The poverty situation, they find, worsened over the six-year period 1993-94 to 1999-2000 in Assam, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. In the remaining 12 states there was a distinct improvement in terms of the most visible indicator, namely, the absolute size of the poor population. Overall, despite diversity across poverty indicators and across states, the overwhelming impression is one of greater improvement in the poverty situation in the 1990s than in the previous 10�½-year period.

The fact that NSS estimates of aggregate household consumer expenditure (HCE) tend to be lower than NAS estimates of private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) has spurred suggestions to pro-rata adjust the NSS-based size distribution on the basis of this difference. Drawing on a joint CSO-NSSO exercise at cross-validation of NAS and NSS, this paper details weaknesses of both types of estimates, but shows that NAS cannot be accepted as a more reliable yardstick for either aggregate consumption expenditure or that on specific commodity groups. This is due to the inherent 'fluidity' of NAS estimates, weaknesses in their underlying database, and the fragility of the rates, ratios and norms used in the commodityflow balance underpinning the PFCE. Despite its shortcomings, it is argued that NSS is preferable because it is based on direct observations relating to the survey period and because, unlike NAS, it avoids recourse to adjustments based on arbitrary assumptions.