Articles by Arvind Panagariya

It has been argued that reforms in India cannot be credited with higher growth because growth rate had crossed the 5 per cent mark in the 1980s, well before the launch of the July 1991 reforms. This is a wrong reading of the Indian experience for two reasons. First, liberalisation was already under way during the 1980s and it played a crucial role in stimulating growth during that decade. Second, growth in the 1980s was fragile and unsustainable. The more systematic and systemic reforms of the 1990s, discussed in detail, gave rise to more sustainable growth. The paper concludes with a discussion of why the growth rate in India nevertheless continues to trail that of China

In developing our future negotiating positions, we need to think far more systematically than we have done so far. At least three strategic conclusions can be drawn from the Uruguay Round and Doha experiences. First, we need to consider the direct benefits to us of any demand we put forward in the negotiations. Second, diplomacy requires that we define our negotiating position positively rather than negatively. Finally, and most importantly, prior to defining our negotiating position, we must think hard about the end-game. By repeatedly staking a position that is far from what we eventually accept, as has been the case in the UR Agreement and the Doha Declaration, we lose credibility in future negotiations and risk being isolated. This risk has now increased manifold with the entry of China into WTO.