ISSN (Print) - 0012-9976 | ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846

Articles by Ali AhmedSubscribe to Ali Ahmed

Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating Escalation

India’s unwillingness to tactically manipulate escalation makes its responses predictable and has led to strategic inertia most evident in the handling of the situation at the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.

Why India Did Not Go to War with China

India had the military ability to evict the intrusions in Ladakh or carry out a quick grab action of its own in the early stages of the crisis. Yet, it did not exercise the offensive military options. The explanation for such strategic reticence lies at the political level. 

Approaching Kashmir through Theoretical Lenses

The National Democratic Alliance government’s Kashmir policy can be analysed through the lenses of security studies and peace studies. Insights from these disciplinary fields could help gauge the implications of recent actions and suggest a possible different course.

Military Professionalism and Effectiveness

The military’s input to national security may be swayed by ideological winds if it loses its apolitical grounding. The government and military must thus maintain the status quo on civil–military relations.

The Modi Era

The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But, a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability. 

Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority

When the army is called in aid of civil authority, robust action taken by the army in a timely manner can prevent civil disturbance from exacting a strategic cost. The recent revelations on army inaction in the critical first 24 hours during the Gujarat carnage in 2002 are examined.

Modi at the Helm

Nuclear decision-making, when examined at the institutional and individual levels, suggests that India’s case is fraught with shortcomings. This adds to the complications for regional security, already present on account of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making being military dominated. The aggravated institutional infirmities of India’s nuclear decision-making structures and the authoritarian tendencies in India’s primary nuclear decision-maker, the Prime Minister, heighten nuclear dangers in future crises and conflicts.

The Doval Scorecard

As the ruling party at the centre, the Bharatiya Janata Party, contemplates the forthcoming national elections, its record on national security warrants a review. The key player in crafting and implementing its national security strategy has been National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. An examination of Doval’s record over the past four years reveals that his principal contribution has been in facilitating national security interests to be held hostage to the electoral calculus of the Narendra Modi–Amit Shah combine.

The Missing Muslim Army Officers

The representation of Muslims in the army officer corps, at around 2%, is abysmal in contrast to their percentage in the population of India. Diversity is also compromised in the army, with over half of army officers hailing from a handful of north Indian states. This deficit of diversity along social and geographical lines has negative implications for the army’s apolitical and secular credentials.

The Kashmir Charade This Winter

The ill-planned and hurried appointment of an interlocutor for Kashmir by the government, supposedly for a sustained dialogue, does not suggest that the government is serious about resolving the Kashmir conflict. The initiative, however, appears to want to hold the United States at bay, which needs India and Pakistan talking to safeguard its Afghan engagement. The interlocutor’s mission will likely turn out to be yet another wasted opportunity in Kashmir. 

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